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The study is an analysis of the views of Justice
William Brennan in three kinds of free expression cases that
have come before the Supreme Court since Brennan' s appoint-
ment in 1957. The areas examined are obscenity censorship,
libel and internal security. Justice Brennan's opinions in
each of these areas are examined. Particular attention is
paid to his use of the balancing approach and his viev7 of
the Supreme Court's role in protecting freedom of expression.
The study demonstrates his influence in defining the Warren
Court's position in each of the three areas examined.
As a freshman Justice, Brennan wrote the majority
opinion in Roth v. United States [354 U.S. 476 (1957)], the
first time the Court had squarely dealt with the constitu-
tional status of obscene expression. From that original at-
tempt to define obscenity, Brennan's evolution to a position
rejecting such an effort is traced. The second section of
the first chapter examines Justice Brennan's demands as to
the proper procedures to be employed if regulation of ob-
scenity is to meet the requirements of the First Amendment.
iii
Justice Brennan's libel opinions are the subject of
the second chapter. His majority opinion in N e_w York Times
V. Sullivan [376 U.S. 254 (1964)] constitutes one of the
m.ore important First Amendment decisions made by the Court
and is the first libel case discussed. Brennan's consequent
extension of the actual malice rule, established in New York
Times
,
is examined.
While Justice Brennan's views in internal security
cases have been of less influence than his efforts in the
first two areas examined, one of his opinions, Uphaus v.
W^man [360 U.S. 72 (1959)] is an excellent example of the
use of the balancing approach in free expression cases.
Brennan's balancing is compared at that point to the use of
that technique by Justice Harlan.
The concluding section of the work discusses Justice
Brennan's views on several free expression issues which do
not fit into any category. These include the right to access
and the power of government to impose prior restraints on ex-
pression.
The study also indicates how Justice Brennan's posi-
tion within the Court changed as a result of the four appoint-
ments made by President Nixon. Brennan's shift is shown to
be particularly significant in obscenity censorship.
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INTRODUCTION
This study is designed to examine views of freedom of
expression and its function in the American system of
government. During the period covered, 1956-1975, three
types of free expression cases comprised the bulk of the
Court's work in that area. They were obscenity censorship,
libel and internal security. Justice Brennan's position on
each or these issues is examined separately.
William Brennan was appointed by President Eisenhower
on September 29, 1956, and took his seat on the Court on
October 16. A nominal Democrat, Brennan's appointment by
the Republican President followed a pattern which had been
established when Governor Driscoll, also a Republican, ap-
pointed him to the New Jersey Superior Court in 1949.
Brennan rose very rapidly after this initial service, going
to the Appellate Branch of the New Jersey Superior Court
in 1950 and, in 1952, being appointed again by Driscoll, to
the state's highest judicial body, the Supreme Court.
His elevation to the U. S. Supreme Court at the age
of 50 to replace the retiring Justice ^^ton was the culmin-
ation of an impressive career of public service.
Justice Brennan's father was an Irish Catholic immi-
vi
grant who was a union reformer and eventually became Newark's
Commissioner of Public Safety. After attending high school
in Newark, Justice Brennan entered the l^arton School of
Finance and Commerce of the University of Pennsylvania from
which he graduated with honors. He then entered Harvard Law
School where he served as President of the Legal Aid Society.
Upon graduation in 1931, he joined the Newark law firm of
Pitney, Harden and Skinner and became a partner in 1937.
With the coming of World War II, Brennan accepted a commis-
sion rs a major in the Army Ordinance D2partm£nt. After a
brief tenure in that position he was called upon by the Air
Corps to deal with problems in the west coast aircraft indus-
try. Undersecretary of War Robert Patterson then put
Brennan on his staff where he remained as a troubleshooter
for manpower problems until the war was over. Between the
end of the war and his appointment to the New Jersey
Superior Court, Brennan was occupied with his private law
practice.
Justice Brennan 's appointment to the Supreme Court
came at the beginning of a crucial period in the history of
the Court. The civil rights struggle was just beginning and
Americans were generally insecure because of the pressures
of the Cold War. Both of these elements caused significant
strains on First Amendment rights. But during the late
1940 's and early 1950 's the Court was dominated by a con-
servative majority that was not particularly sympathetic to
Vll
^
civil liberties claims. By 1955, a bloc consisting of Chief
Justice Warren and Justices Black and Douglas were consis-
tently calling for greater protection for individual free-
doms. Unlike most freshman Justices, Brennan. upon assuming
his seat in 1956, did not take a centrist position between
the two blocs on the Court. Rather he very quickly alligned
himself with the activist- libertarian wing of the Court. By
the end of his first term of the Court then he was part of a
group of Justices calling for a halt to the numerous attacks
being made upon freedom of expression.
Before examining Justice Brennan' s views, I should
make clear my ovm position with respect to several of the
free expression issues raised herein.
It is my view that freedom of expression plays the
most important role in establishing the character of the
American system. Most essentially it provides a means where-
by the citizenry can participate in the governing of the
nation. But more broadly, a vigorous system of freedom of
expression plays a critical role in the evolution of society
in general. The free interchange of ideas encouraged by a
liberal reading of the First Amendment's protection of ex-
pression is necessary if social values are not to become
stagnant
.
While I view freedom of expression thusly, I do not
favor an absolute or literal reading of the First Amendment.
To my mind the absolutist approach is unwise for the most
viii
obvious reason: There are some instances in which expression
should be restricted. If it could be clearly shown, for ex-
ample, that failing to limit expression would lead to vio-
lence then that particular expression should be limited in
that particular context. Secondly, a wiser approach in
dealing with free expression issues seems to me to be the
balancing approach as employed by Justice Brennan. As we
shall see. Brennan requires clear and convincing evidence that
the interest asserted in opposition to expression is first,
a valid interest and, second, one that could not be pursued
by any means other than a limitation of expression. Further,
I am of the view that the Supreme Court bears the primary re-
sponsibility for striking this balance. In short, I view the
Court as the most important protector of free expression.
Overall then, I concur in Justice Brennan' s reading of
the First Amendment and his view of the Court's role in pro-
tecting freedom of expression. The points at which my views
diverge from his are indicated in the text below.
ix
CHAPTER I
JUSTICE BRENNAN AND OBSCENITY CENSORSHIP
Obscenity censorship is clearly the most difficult
free speech issue vzith which the Court has dealt during
Justice Brennan's tenure. The obvious problem of arriving
at a definition of the obscene has rendered more complex
other disagreements within the Court as to the constitu-
tional status of obscenity, the procedural aspects of cen-
sorship and the relative powers of the state and federal
governments to censor.
Justice Brennan has played a major role in develop-
ing the Court's position. Since 1957, the Court has handed
down 33 written opinions in obscenity cases. Until 1968,
Justice Brennan wrote more majority or plurality opinions
than any other member of the Court --in eleven of the
eighteen cases decided to that point. After 1968, and due
in part to the changes which occurred in the makeup of the
Court, Justice Brennan became one of the more frequent dis-
senters, dissenting in eight of the fifteen cases decided
between 1968 and the end of the 1972-1973 term. Wnile this
pattern reflects to a great extent the impact of the four
Nixon appointees, it is also a result of a significant
change in Justice Brennan's views of the obscenity
censorship issue. As we shall see, he has rejected the rule
for which he was primarily responsible.^
This chapter will be organized as follows. The first
section deals with Justice Brennan's attempts to define ob-
scenity. This will be followed by an examination of the pro
cedures he would require if censorship of the obscene is to
escape constitutional infirmity. In June of 1973, the Court
handed down seven obscenity decisions, ^ and in each Justice
Brennan dissented. The views expressed in those dissents
mark a substantial shift in his position and warrant very
close examination. Consequently, the section dealing with
procedure will be followed by an analysis of Brennan's new
position and the change effected in obscenity law by the
Court majority. As will be seen. Justice Brennan has come t
reject both his own early views and the Court's new stance.
Defining the Obscene
Barely six months after his appointment to the Court,
Justice Brennan delivered the majority opinion in Roth v.
3United States
. This became the leading case in obscenity
censorship, since the Court had never previously dealt
squarely with the constitutional status of obscene expres-
4
sion. The case involved an appeal from a conviction under
the federal obscenity law which prohibits the use of the
mails for the distribution of obscene materials.^
But Justice Brennan ignored the question of whether
the challenged materials were in fact obscene. He discussed
3
instead whether obscene expression in general was afforded
protection by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. It was
clear, he felt, that that protection was not absolute.
There were some forms of expression which could properly be
limited. While the First Amendment protects some distaste-
ful expression, it does so only when and because that par-
ticular expression stimulates the interchange of ideas.
But for Brennan obscene expression contributed nothing to an
exchange of views: it was "utterly without redeeming social
importance." Consequently, it was outside the protection of
the First Amendment. That view was confirmed, he said, by
various Supreme Court dicta and the fact that every state
and the federal government had legislated against obscene
expression. Since obscene expression in general was out-
side constitutional protection, Brennan felt it was unneces-
sary to ask whether a specific instance of obscenity created
a clear and present danger.
By fiat then. Justice Brennan condemned obscene ex-
pression to the lower level of what Kalven calls the "two-
level-free-speech- theory. "^ Obscenity was grouped with ex-
pression so harmful by its very utterance that no considera-
tion need be given to the circumstances surrounding its use.
Generally, Justice Brennan believes that in each
case in which expression is challenged, a judge must balance
the value of that particular expression against the value
of those interests affected by it. But, of course, here,
in obscenity, he explicitly rejects that approach. The appar-
ent reason for this tactic is the fact that one does not know
what interest, if any, is being affected by the use of obscene
expression. Even now, seventeen years after Roth, it is still
unclear as to whether exposure to obscene expression leads to
anti-social behavior or has broader harmful consequences to
society. So Justice Brennan did not have clear evidence either
that obscenity was harmful or harmless. Consequently, he, in
effect, fell back on a view which ultimately reduces to this:
since obscenity has been universally condemned as lacking in
social value, it is therefore unprotected. But again, that is
not at all an accurate reflection of the value he places on
freedom of expression. As will be made clear, he is not one
of those who would submit the First Amendment to popular refer-
endum. He simply felt he had little other choice given the
uncertainty of the empirical evidence as to the effects of ob-
scenity.
Further, it is important to keep in mind that Brennan'
s
declaration that obscenity is unprotected is of little prac-
tical consequence without a definition of what constitutes
the obscene. At one time American courts used the Hicklin
test.*^ That standard permitted the evaluation of allegedly
obscene material on the basis of its likely impact on the
person most susceptible to it. Further, isolated passages
of a work could render the entire work obscene. Justice
Brennan' s Roth test, as it became known, sought to overcome
the defects of the Hicklin formula. When evaluating whether
Lin-
material is obscene, the test to be applied was
.. .whether to the average person, applyingcontemporary community standards, the domi-^
nant theme of the material taken as a wholeappeals to prurient interest.
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As Justice Brennan himself later recognized,^ the Roth test
is not without problems, but any substitute would also be
perfect. There is simply no way to define precisely what is
essentially a value judgment. But Justice Brennan later fre-
quently attempted to explain what he meant by the Roth defi-
nition, and, in so doing, modified that standard.
Seven years after first announcing the Roth test,
Justice Brennan sought to clarify it.^° A work was obscene,
he said, if it was patently offensive, a term Justice Harlan
had employed in the Manual Enterprises case.-^-*- If obscene,
it was unprotected because it was, as he said in Roth
,
"utterly without redeeming social importance." Justice
Brennan uses the social value test as the dividing line be-
tween protected speech and unprotected obscenity. His in-
sistence that a work be "utterly" devoid of value reflects
his concern that serious literary and/or scientific work
which is erotic and perhaps esoteric could be judged obscene
if its value, albeit limited, were not taken into account.
In short, what he has consistently attempted to do is to
provide the broadest possible freedom for expression while
at the same time leaving the door open for limiting expres-
sion he deems valueless. The difficulty with the social
value test, however, is that it is not the kind of "sensitive
tool" Brennan recognizes as necessary
.
.
.to separate obscenity from other sex-ually oriented but constitutionally pro-tected speech, so that efforts to suppressthe former do not spill over into the sup-pression of the latter. ^2
And again, it is probably not possible to devise such a tool
given the inherent nature of obscenity.
At the same time that Justice Brennan was stressing
the importance of social value as a guide in obscenity censor-
ship, he made a significant change in what social importance
represented. In the Roth case, Brennan had held that ob-
scenity was unprotected because it lacked redeeming social
importance-- that lack of value was a characteristic of the ob-
scene. But in his first major reinterpretation of Roth
seven years later, social value becomes a measure of whether
material is in fact obscene. And so he states
Nor may the constitutional status of the
material be made to turn on a 'weighing'
of its social importance against its
prurient appeal, for a work cannot be
proscribed unless it is 'utterly' with-
out social importance.-'-^
This means then that a work may be patently offensive and
possess a prurient appeal, but still not be obscene if it
has some social value. Justice Brennan made this point even
more clearly in the Memoirs case'^'^ where he again attempted
to refine the Roth test. In Memoirs he expressed the view
that Roth required the 'coalescing' of three elements before
a work may be judged obscene.
it must be established that (a) the domi-
nant theme of the material taken as a whole
appeals to prurient interest in sex;(b) the material is patently offensivebecause it affronts contemporary com-
munity standards relating to the de-scription or representation of sexual
matters; and (c) the material is utterlywithout redeeming social value. 15
For Brennan, each of the three tests must be applied inde-
pendently and not balanced one against the other. Again
here he stressed that the challenged work must be utterly
lacking in social importance before it can be suppressed.
That was in fact the reason the Massachusetts ban on Memoirs
was rejected by Brennan; the state high court had ruled that
the book was obscene even though it did possess some social
value. So up to this point at least, the social importance
standard was the major underpinning of Brennan' s obscenity
test, and as he frequently stated, it was in no case to be
relaxed. In short, material had to be "utterly," totally,
devoid of value before it could be censored.
But on the very same day he rejected a state court
judgment of Memoirs as obscene because it was based on a re-
laxation of the social value test, he himself grafted an ex-
ception onto that standard."'"^
That exception was an element originally suggested by
Chief Justice Warren in his Roth opinion.
The conduct of the defendant is the cen-
tral issue, not the obscenity of a book or
picture. The nature of the materials is,
of course, relevant as an attribute of the
defendant's conduct, but the materials are
thus placed in a context from which they
draw color and character. 1^
. . . They [the defendants] were plainly
engaged in the commercial exploitation ofthe morbxd and shameful craving for materi-als wxth prurient effect. I believe thatthe State and Federal Governments can con-
stitutionally punish such conduct. 18
Justice Brennan called this kind of conduct pandering, and
so labelled the actions of Ralph Ginzburg, publisher of
several works banned from the mails. The circumstances
which led Brennan to the conclusion that Ginzburg had
pandered were several. The publisher had tried to obtain
mailing permits from first Blue Ball, and then Intercourse,
Pennsylvania. Failing at both stations because of their in-
ability to handle such a large amount of material, Ginzburg
did all his mailing from Middlesex, New Jersey. Further the
advertisements for the materials carried the assurance that
in the event of Post Office censorship, the full purchase
price would be refunded to the buyer. Justice Brennan felt
that all of this was an attempt to further the materials
"salacious appeal" and for him "... where the purveyor's
sole emphasis is on the sexually provocative aspects of his
publications that fact may be decisive in the determination
1 Q
of obscenity."
Of course, none of this spoke to the content of the
three challenged works; Eros
,
The Housewife's Handbook of
Selective Promiscuity
,
and Liaison . Justice Brennan con-
ceded, at least in the case of the first two, that each may
have possessed some limited social value. And because the
value was only limited, the "fact" that the seller had
pandered rendered the works obscene.
9
Several points must be made here. First, and most im-
portant. Justice Brennan did in fact in this case relax the
social value test. After 1966, and despite Brennan' s dis-
claimers, a book needed no longer to be "utterly without re-
deeming social importance" before it might be declared ob-
scene in a particular situation. Brennan claims this is not
so, that all the Court does when it declares a pandered work
of limited social value obscene is to accept the purveyor's
judgment as to the nature of his wares. But. regardless of
whose judgment is being accepted, the fact remains that the
effect of Brennan' s position here is to permit the cen-
soring of works possessing some social value. But there is
a distinction to be made here x^rhich 1 think explains this
seeming inconsistency. In confronting the Ginzburg case,
Justice Brennan dealt with two elements; the challenged
materials and the actions of the seller. Brennan conceded
that the works in question possessed some social value.
Consequently, standing alone they could not be obscene,
they were not utterly lacking in value and could not there-
fore be censored. But of course they were not standing
alone. Justice Brennan obviously disapproved of Ginzburg'
s
"sordid business" and consequently sought to punish him.
The materials then became, in a sense, the somewhat innocent
victims of their promoter. What Brennan had done, in short,
was to punish Ginzburg for pandering. He did not declare
Eros
,
et . al. , obscene in all contexts. But promoted in
con-
-ce
10
the fashion Ginzburg employed, they became, in that context,
obscene. Further, by allowing Ginzburg's fine and jail sen-
tence to stand, the Court's decision had the practical
sequence of censoring the cited works. Secondly, Justi,
Brennan's reliance on pandering as an element in his ob-
scenity calculus is simply a recasting of the prurient appeal
facet of the Roth test. In the Memoirs case, Brennan re-
quired a conjoining of prurient appeal, patent offensive-
ness and utter lack of social importance before a work could
be held obscene. But, in Ginzburg
.
the nature of the appeal
becomes determinative in spite of the fact that patent of-
fensiveness is not demonstrated, nor even discussed, and the
challenged works are admitted to possess some social value.
In short, what was at one time one third of the obscenity
test becomes for Brennan the sole determining standard in
what he calls "close cases" wherein a work is of limited
value and has been pandered. And that standard is employed
as a measure of the purveyor's actions and not as a test of
a book's contents.
Justice Brennan's use of the pandering test is an
adaptation of a concept called "variable obscenity" dis-
cussed most fully by Lockhard and McClure.^"^ As they ex-
plain it, this concept assumes that no material is in-
herently obscene but that obscenity varies with the circum-
stances of its distribution. A judge would evaluate chal-
lenged material in light of its appeal to and effect on the
11
audience to which it was primarily directed. If the circum-
stances indicated that the appeal was prurient and was aimed
at the lustful interests of the average person in the in-
tended audience, then the work would be judged obscene.
This approach has one great virtue: it is a far
simpler approach to the question of obscenity than the rather
thankless task of evaluating a work's content in an effort
to determine whether it is obscene. Surely, a judge could
more easily evaluate a purveyor's intent than that of a
writer. But while it offers less complexity in application,
the concept of variable obscenity has two very serious flaws.
As Justice Douglas indicated in his Memoirs concurrence^^
and his Ginzburg dissent, the nature of an advertisement
has little to do with the quality of the product advertised.
Would a lewd advertisement offering the Bible for sale there-
0 /by render it obscene? In short, the variable obscenity ap-
proach and Brennan's use of it would have one believe, as it
were, that you can tell an obscene book by its cover. The
second problem with Brennan's use of variable obscenity in
Ginzburg was also pointed out in a dissent, that of Justice
Black.
Ginzburg is, as I see it, having his con-
viction affirmed upon the basis of a statute
amended by this Court for violation of which
amended statute he was not charged in the
courts below. Such an affirmance we have
said violates due process.
What Black is saying here is simply that there is no law
against pandering, the determinative factor in Brennan's
12
decision. Ginzburg was charged with using the mails to dis-
tribute obscene materials. The materials themselves were
not found obscene but became so because of Ginzburg'
s
actions, which actions, again, were not illegal, at least
not before Justice Brennan's decision.
Justice Brennan again employed variable obscenity in
a case involving materials designed for deviant sexual
27groups. The publisher of the materials, Edward Mishkin,
claimed that the materials could not be held obscene since
they did not appeal to the prurient interest of the average
person. Since the material was designed for deviant sexual
groups, he claimed it would disgust the average person of
the Roth test.
In short, the contention here was that Roth had im-
posed an inelastic standard that did not vary at all, in
part this argument reflects a dependence on Justice
I
2
"
Brennan's Jacobellis ° opinion in which he so emphatically
stressed that the components of Roth could not be "weighed."
Of course, Brennan himself had in fact done precisely that
in the Ginzburg case.
Consistent with Ginzburg , Brennan rejected Mishkin'
s
argument. He said that the average person concept of Roth
had been employed simply to counteract the most susceptible
person facet of the Hicklin test.
Where the material is designed for an pri-
marily disseminated to a clearly defined
deviant sexual group, rather than the pub-
lic at large, the prurient-appeal requirement
13
of the Roth test is satisfied if thedominant theme of the material taken asa whole appeals to the prurient interestin sex of tne members of that group. 29
In short, if the circumstances surrounding the production of
challenged material indicated that it was designed to appeal
to a particular group, then the average person in that group
became the average person under Roth.^^ What this meant
then was that a judge attempting to evaluate whether material
was obscene must conduct a process which may be character-
ized as follows. He must first establish what group consti-
tutes the primary intended audience. Then he must decide
whether the material has prurient appeal to the average per-
son in that group.
This 1966 trilogy of cases x^as the last time Justice
Brennan dealt with defining obscenity until the Miller^^ and
32Slaton cases which will be discussed separately below.
After nine years of struggling with the Roth definition
then. Justice Brennan had arrived at a standard which may be
restated as follows:
A work is obscene when to the average person
in the intended primary audience, applying
the contemporary national community stan-
dards
,
34 of that audience, the dominant
theme of the work taken as a whole is charac-
terized by a conjoining of prurient appeal,
patent offensiveness and utter lack of re-
deeming social importance. If a work is of
limited social importance and the purveyor
has pandered it, he may be punished for dis-
tributing obscene material,
I think it unnecessary to further criticize this
rule, at least at this point. The best attack on it came
non-
a
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from Justice Brennan himself in his Slaton opinion. As he
there recognizes, his attempts at defining the obscene were
in fact futile and did not provide the protection for
obscene expression that he sought. Again, it was not
matter of Justice Brennan failing to fashion the proper
standard that lead to the confused state of obscenity law,
but rather the nature of the problem itself.
/Justice Brennan' s general approach to the problem of
defining obscenity is indicative of his desire to provide
broad protection for freedom of expression, mat he has
done has been to state, first, that obscenity is unprotected
by the First Amendment. Standing alone, that view would ap-
pear to be inimical to free speech interests. But his at-
tempts to define "obscene" and his application of that defi-
nition to challenged materials make it clear that his goal
is to provide very broad protection for sexually oriented
material. It is important to keep in mind that Justice
Brennan did not find any of the materials before the Court
obscene in and of themselves. It is true that Eros and
Mishkin's materials were suppressed but, again, that was
simply a consequence of the primary motive of Brennan' s view
in those cases, i.e ., to punish those who had pandered. In
practical terms, that distinction nay not be terribly signi-
ficant. But to Justice Brennan, it is a crucial one.
Brennan' s commitment to a vigorous system of free ex-
pression is even more clearly demonstrated by his view of
15
the procedures required if censorship is to escape consti-
tutional infirmity. As we shall now see, his goal here is
the same as it was in his efforts to define: to insure that
the non-obscene is not condemned along with the obscene.
Given the fact that Justice Brennan feels that ob-
scene expression is unprotected, the procedures he requires
of potential censors are critical in helping to define his
commitment to freedom of expression. Clearly, were he to
permit wide latitude, to allow censors to adopt any con-
venient procedure, the First Amendment would thereby suffer.
But as we shall see below. Justice Brennan would in fact al-
low little variation in the procedures employed to suppress
the obscene.
./Justice Brennan' s major concern in dealing with cen-
sorship procedures is to insure that protected expression is
not suppressed along with the obscene. In his words, the
censor is required to employ "sensitive tools." Attempting
to provide such aids. Justice Brennan has dealt primarily
with two major aspects of the procedure issue: the status of
prior restraint of expression and the role to be played by
the judicial process. His opinion in the Marcus case^^
exemplifies this approach.
The procedure employed in that case was initiated by
the filing of a sworn complaint by a police officer "posi-
tively" stating that obscene material was being kept. The
judge receiving the complaint v/ould then issue a warrant.
16
directed to any peace officer, to seize the cited material.
Once the police had accomplished the seizure, the judge was
to set a date not less than 5 nor more than 20 days after
seizure for a trial to determine whether the material was in
fact obscene. State law did not establish any time limit
within which a decision had to be reached on that issue.
Justice Brennan found the procedure defective for
several reasons. The initial complaint was itself defective
in that it was too general. Citation of the specific x^orks
to be seized was not required, state law permitting a warrant
to issue upon a complaint against "obscene materials." The
warrant also did not cite particular materials. Further,
judges were not required to render a decision as to whether
the material was obscene within any specified time limit.
But Justice Brennan 's major objection to Missouri procedure
was that the judge never saw the cited materials prior to
issuing the warrant for seizure. In short, a restraint was
imposed prior to an adversary hearing.
Justice Brennan sees an adversary hearing as a criti-
cal safeguard for protected expression. The censor's busi-
ness is to censor and consequently
there inheres the danger that he may well be
less responsive than a court--part of an in-
dependent branch of government --to the con-
stitutionally protected interests in free
expression . 37
Furthermore, Brennan would require the courts to act as a
check prior to the imposition of an extensive restraint.
38
Justice Brennan does not condemn all prior restraint.
In Marcus he makes it clear that a restraint may be imposed
prior to an adversary hearing. But that restraint must be
brief: under the precedent he cites , ^9 ^hree days between
the issuance of a £ente^ lite injunction and a decision on
the issue. In short, a work can be temporarily restrained
but only for a brief period while a trial is held to deter-
mine if it is obscene and will therefore be permanently re-
strained.
Justice Brennan spoke more directly to the prior re-
straint issue in Freedman v. Maryland
. This was also the
opinion in which he provided the most precise statement of
the procedures he requires if censorship of the obscene is
to be permissible. As was the case in Times Film, ^"^
Freedman involved the refusal of an official board of cen-
sors to license the exhibition of a film^^ unless it was
first submitted to them. Justice Brennan pointed out that
like all forms of prior restraint, this particular method
carried a presumption against its constitutionality. If
such procedures were to escape constitutional infirmity.
Justice Brennan would require that they incorporate the
following minimal standards:
1. The burden of proof must rest upon the
censor to establish that the film is ob-
scene. In short, all films are assumed
not obscene, protected, until proven
otherwise
.
2. The states may employ a prior restraint
to bar exhibition of a film temporarily
but a final restraint cannot be imposed
until a judicial decision has been reached
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that the film is in fact obscene.
3. Either the state courts or state law
must require the censor either to licensethe film or go to court to restrain itwithm a specified period.
4. Any restraint prior to judicial determin-
ation ot the issues must be as brief aspossible
.
5. State procedure must provide for "Promptfinal judicial decision."
Again, these procedures emphasize that Justice Brennan views
any proper scheme of censorship as basically a judicial pro-
cedure. While censors working under the aegis of an admini-
strative agency may impose a brief restraint, it is only to
provide them with time to bring the issue before a judge.
The final, permanent restraint can only result from the de-
cision of a court.
Before proceeding to a discussion of the Slaton and
Miller cases and the changes in Brennan' s view evident there-
in, note must be taken of two cases in which Justice Brennan
joined Justice White's majority opinions. '^^ Those two votes,
1 think, illuminate an important facet of Justice Brennan'
s
approach in obscenity censorship.
Both cases involved the majority's rejection of what
might have seemed to be logical extensions of Stanley v.
45Georgia
. The majority in Stanley had held that mere pri-
vate possession of obscene materials, in one's home, could
not constitutionally be made a crime. Justice Brennan had
not been part of the Stanley majority, joining instead
's
-ce
19
Justice Stewart's concurrence. Stewart felt that Stanley
conviction should have been voided on Fourth Amendment
grounds: the allegedly obscene films were seized by poli,
acting under a warrant permitting them to search for
gambling materials. But five members of the Court had felt
that the determinative issue was the "... right to receive
information and ideas, regardless of their social worth.
the right to be free, except in very limited circumstances,
from unwanted governmental intrusions into one's privacy. "^^
Obviously, if this right to possess any material in
one's home is to be anything but empty words, one must be
able to obtain it somewhere, someone must sell it to him.
But Justice l^Jhite, who also had joined Stewart's concurrence
Stanley
,
felt quite differently. In the Reidel case.
White held that
To extrapolate from Stanley's right to have
and peruse obscene material in the privacy of
his own home a First Amendment right in Reidel
to sell it to him would effectively scuttle
Roth, the precise result that the Stanley opin-
ion abjured. Whatever the scope of the right
to receive" referred to in Stanley, it is not
so broad as to immunize the dealings in obscen-
ity in which Reidel engaged here--dealings that
Roth held unprotected by the First Amendment.
Again, in U. S. v. 37 Photos
,
White refused to "extrapolate"
from the Stanley decision. But here the claimed extension
of that case was the right to import obscene pictures for
private and possible commercial use.
It seems to me that Justice Brennan's joining in
these opinions reflects what is, I think, his sore point in
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obscenity questions. While he would impose severe limita-
tions on censors by requiring precise procedures
, and re-
quire a Solomon-like understanding of and concurrence with
his definition of the obscene, he has demonstrated a total
lack of patience with some sellers of obscene material. In
that sense his vote in these two cases completes the pattern
begun in his Ginzburg opinion. There as a result of his de-
sire to punish Ginzburg, he permitted material to be judged
obscene even though it did not fulfill all of the require-
ments of his own definition of obscene. And by joining in
these two majorities he participates in a result which
Justice Black concludes means that a man may possess obscene
material as long as he "
. . . writes salacious books in his
attic, prints them in his basement and reads them in his
living room."
I think it is this sort of illogic which finally led
Justice Brennan to reject all he had fashioned in 16 years
of toiling with obscenity censorship. But more importantly,
Brennan' s rather remarkable shift in Slaton was a product of
his concern that the illogic was damaging to freedom of ex-
pression. In that sense then his Slaton views are his at-
tempt to begin again to regulate obscenity while at the same
time providing the broadest possible protection for what he
viex<7S as the most critical of the Bill of Rights.
Miller v. California^^ and Paris Adult Theater v.
Slaton^'^ will be treated here as one case. The discussion
of Chief Justice Burger's views will focus on three major
issues: the social value test; his use of the balancing ap-
proach; and the obscenity standard he produced. That will
be followed by an analysis of Justice Brennan's dissent and
an evaluation of the views contained therein.
The social value test was the nucleus of Justice
Brennan's approach to obscenity and its status with respect
to the First Amendment. Initially in Roth,^^ he had held
obscenity unprotected because it lacked redeeming social im-
portance. But then in Jacobell is ^-^ and later in Memoirs ^^
he had employed social value as a measure of whether a work
was obscene rather than as a characteristic of obscenity.
Chief Justice Burger viewed that shift as a "sharp depart-
ure" from Roth
. The fact that prosecutors would have to
prove that a work was "utterly lacking in redeeming social
importance" meant, he said, that virtually nothing could be
55proved obscene. Consequently, Burger rejected the social
value test as both impossible to meet and ambiguous. In its
place, the Chief Justice substituted the following:
At a minimum, prurient
,
patently offensive
depiction or description of sexual conduct
must have serious literary, artistic, po-
litical or scientific value to merit First
Amendment protection.-'
One might call this the "serious value" test. Of course,
it is no less ambiguous than the social value rule and is
in fact simply a rephrasing of the earlier formulation. In
Jacobellis , ^ Justice Brennan wrote
. . .
material dealing with sex in a manner
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that advocates ideas.
. .or that hasliterary or scientific or artistic value
°^li^n^-Qther_fo rTn of social importanrp
nied the constitutional protection. 58
In short. Burger's changing of social value to serious value
accomplishes nothing positive. The ambiguity remains as
does the need to prove that a work possesses no serious
value before it may be declared obscene. ^NThat the change
does accomplish is to further obfuscate the already muddled
state of obscenity law by giving the appearance of change
while not changing at all.^^
As pointed out earlier, Justice Brennan did not em-
ploy the balancing approach in the obscenity cases. I am of
the opinion that this was due to the fact that it was, and
is, too unclear as to what interests obscenity effects.
But that lack of certainty did not bother the Chief
6
1
Justice. Most generally, a state can censor obscenity
under its "broad power to regulate commerce and protect the
public environment." More specifically he argued that
... there are legitimate state interests
at stake in stemming the tide of commer-
cialized obscenity.
. . .These include the
interest of the public in the quality of
life and the total community environment,
the tone of commerce in the great city
centers, and, possibly, the public safety
itself. The Hill-Link Minority Report of
the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography
indicates that there is at least an argu-
able correlation between obscene material
and crime. ^2
It is clear from the tone of Burger's opinion that the most
important interest he feels is being protected by censorship
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of obscenity is the public safety. He does not explicitly
state that obscenity leads to anti-social behavior but is
prepared to permit regulation on the "assumption" that expo-
sure to the obscene has "a tendency to exert a corrupting
and debasing impact leading to antisocial behavior." But of
course the majority report of the Commission on Obscenity
and Pornography concludes that empirical research into the
connection between obscenity and antisocial behavior has
failed to turn up any evidence demonstrating a causal rela-
6 3tionship. Chief Justice Burger however would permit state
legislatures to "reasonably" determine that exposure to ob-
scenity might lead to antisocial conduct and upon that
basis, regulate expression.
This is what I find to be one of the more objection-
able features of the Burger view. What he permits here is
the sacrifice of freedom of expression on the mere possi-
bility that it might cause anti-social behavior. His view
that limitation of expression may be properly based on an
assumption that it has a "tendency" to debase and corrupt is
a retreat to the vagaries of the Hicklin test. It demon-
strates what is at best a very casual commitment to freedom
of expression. The Chief Justice claims that it is not for
the Court to settle the empirical uncertainties concerning
the effects of exposure to obscenity. But of course, his
opinions have precisely that effect in that lawmakers are
now free to limit obscenity because it might lead to anti-
social conduct.
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Chief Justice Burger views this state power as
limited to regulation of depictions or descriptions of sex
that are obscene. The rule he provides as the test of a
work's obscenity is very much a rephrasing of the Roth test.
(a) whether 'the average person, applying con-temporary community standards' would findthat thework, taken as a whole, appeals to
wn^v^S'"''-^^^
interest,
. . .
(b) whether theork depicts or describes, in a patently of-fensive way, sexual conduct specifically de-fined by the applicable state law, and (c)
whether the work taken as a whole lacks
serious literary, artistic, political or
scientific value.
Basically of course this is Brennan's Memoirs formulation
with the above discussed substitution of the "serious" value
for "social" value. But Burger does make several signifi-
cant additions to the earlier test. First of all, he would re-
quire the states to specifically define the sexual conduct
whose description can be limited. He suggests that these might
include patently offensive depictions of ".
. . ultimate sex
acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated.
. . of mastur-
bation, excretory functions and lewd exhibition of the geni-
66tals." It should be pointed out that the Chief Justice
is attempting to require some precision of obscenity law so
that First Amendment interests are damaged as little as possi-
ble. But obviously, no law which requires that the de-
pictions be "patently offensive" or "lewd" or "perverted" is
very precise at all. Again, this area, obscenity, cannot be
clearly and unambiguously defined. Further, it is difficult
to conceive how legislatures can formulate statutes that
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will specifically describe the acts subject to limitation.
Either the law will be vague, as is the example given by the
Chief Justice, or they will be so specific as to become
easily evaded by those with imagination.
Burger's second major change in the Memoirs formula-
tion concerns the community standards to which he refers.
In Justice Brennan's hands, the community was national in
character. But as Burger correctly indicates, that was
never a majority view. For him, reliance on national
standards is too hypothetical. But local juries can reflect
a state standard in determining what appeals to prurience
and is patently offensive. The Chief Justice feels that
Under a national Constitution, funda-
mental First Amendment limitations on the
pox^7ers of the states do not vary from com-
munity to community, but this does not
mean that there are, or should or can be
fixed, uniform national standards of pre-
cisely what appeals to the 'prurient in-
terest' or is 'patently offensive . ' °
This facet of Burger's approach is at best extremely
puzzling. I simply fail to see how both a uniform First
Amendment and state determination of obscenity standards can
coexist. When a jury decides what expression is obscene and
therefore to be limited, it is at the same time determin-
ing the scope of the First Amendment. The Chief Justice in-
dicates that different states will have different views as
to what is obscene, and he is surely correct. That will mean
that the scope of protection afforded by the First Amendment
will likewise vary. Burger says that free expression inter-
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ests will be protected by the power of state appellate
courts to review the findings of local courts. So in the
final analysis it is the state appellate courts which will
determine obscenity standards and the extent of the First
Amendment's protection of sexually oriented material within
each state. 68 That is precisely the approach for which
Justice Harlan so long argued.
It is too early to determine accurately the practical
consequences of this Balkanization of the First Amendment.
But there are several possibilities. Movie producers and
book publishers may very well have to release several dif-
ferent versions of a film or book, each version keyed to a
particular state or group of states notion of what is not
obscene. If that is economically unfeasible, and it may
well be, the only other alternative is self-censorship in
the form of producing a single version of a work inoffensive
enough to escape limitation in the most sensitive state. In
short, the media may well be reduced to observing the
Hicklin test; to producing only that material which will
not offend the most susceptible community.
All in all, Chief Justice Burger's opinion in the
Miller and Slaton cases seems to me to be a considerable
step backward. His views do nothing to clarify the very
muddled condition of obscenity law and in fact add greatly
to it by permitting the development of a multitude of ob-
scenity standards. Further, there can be no doubt that his
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approach will generate a large number of cases with which
appellate courts will have to deal as the system attempts to
determine precisely what the "new" law of obscenity means.
One consequence of that approach is clear; the protection
afforded sexually oriented expression has been considerably
reduced.
In rejecting the majority view in Slaton and Miller
.
Justice Brennan also rejected his own substantial efforts to
deal with the obscenity issue. His major objection to both
approaches x^as that they were intolerably vague and conse-
quently did not provide the "sensitive tools" required to
distinguish between protected and unprotected expression.
.
. .
after 16 years of experimentation and
debate I am reluctantly forced to the conclusion
that none of the available formulas, including
the one announced today, can reduce the vague-
ness to a tolerable level while at the same time
striking an acceptable balance between the pro-
tections of the First and Fourteenth Amendments,
on the one hand, and on the other the asserted
state interest in regulating the dissemination
of certain sexually oriented materials. Any
effort to draw a constitutionally accep'table boundary
on state power must resort to such indefinite
concepts as 'prurient interest,' 'patent offen-
siveness,' 'serious literary value,' and the like.
The meaning of these concepts varies with the
experience, outlook and even idios3rncracies of
the person defining them. Although we have as-
sumed that obscenity does exist and that we
'know it V7hen [we] see it,' ... we are
manifestly unable to describe it in advance
except by reference to concepts so elusive
that they fail to distinguish clearly between
protected and unprotected speech.''^
Brennan stated that in addition to the failure adequately to
separate protected expression from the obscene, the vagueness
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inherent in the Court's approach to obscenity censorship had
produced several other problems. Lack of precision in the
law meant that there was no fair notice of exactly what was
prohibited. This in turn lead to arbitrary enforcement.
Further, "institutional stress" was created since lox^er
federal and state courts "... cannot say with certainty
that material is obscene until at least five members of this
Court, applying inevitably obscure standards, have pronounced
it so."''^
Justice Brennan felt that the Slaton -Miller approach
not only failed to clear up any of these problems but also
contributed several of its own. Chief Justice Burger's for-
mulation, which Brennan labelled the "physical conduct"
test, was only a slight variation from the Roth formula. It
is premised on the view, as was Roth, that there exists an
identifiable class of speech which can be limited consistent
with the First Amendment. But in rejecting the social value
test, the Chief Justice rejected the "key basis" of Roth :
The Court's approach necessarily assumes that
some works will be deemed obscene--even though
they clearly have some social value- -because
the State was able to prove that the value,
measured by some unspecified standard, was not
sufficiently 'serious' to warrant constitu-
tional protection. That result is not merely
inconsistent with our holding in Roth; it is
nothing less than a rejection of the funda-
mental First Amendment premises and rationale
of the Roth opinion and an invitation to wide-
spread suppression of sexually oriented speech.
Before today, the protections of the First
Amendment have never been thought limited to
expressions of serious literary or political
value . ''2
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In short, Justice Brennan feels ^hp^ m.^ . . .i.eei t at the approach of the
Slaton majority will in<?n-ro t-u^ •, .y xxi sure the censorship of protected
works
.
It is because of that conclusion that Justice Brennan
bases his new approach on the view that
.
. outright sup-
pression of obscenity cannot be reconciled with the funda-
mental principles of the First and Fourteenth Amendment. "^^
But this does not mean that he would leave the states
totally powerless to regulate sexually oriented material.
The state has a proper interest in protecting juveniles and
unconsenting adults from exposure to sexually oriented
materials.
What Justice Brennan has done here is. in a sense, a
logical extension of his approach in Ginzburg
. In that case,
his emphasis was not on the content of the challenged works
but rather on the manner in which they were advertised and
distributed. In Slaton he goes even further in that direc-
tion. Because he demands precision in any law effecting
free expression and because that degree of precision simply
can't be attained with respect to obscenity without serious
damage to the First Amendment, he has decided to attack the
obscenity problem from another direction. The scheme he
7 6V70uld seem to favor ° can be outlined as follows.
States and the federal government would be stripped
of any power to regulate the content of expression on the
basis of its alleged obscenity. But government would be
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free to control the way material is sold and distributed so
as to protect minors and unwilling adults from being exposed
to possibly offensive material. Brennan accepts the
Stanlei,^^ ruling that the "Constitution protects the right
to receive information and ideas" even if they are obscene.
That right, he feels, is closely related to several others:
the right to privacy from unwarranted government intrusion
into personal matters, and in general; and the right to the
free control over the development of one's personality. He
then reasons
that the recognition of these inter-
twining rights calls in question the
validity of the two- level approach recog-
nized in Roth. After all, if a person
has the right to receive information with-
out regard to its social worth--that is
without regard to its obscenity-- then it
would seem to follow that a State could
not constitutionally punish one who under-
takes to provide this information to a
willing adult lecip^nt . 78
In short, no speech is a priori unprotected because of its
content. But it may be regulated if it intrudes on juveniles
or unwilling adults. Again, to extrapolate further, the
practical system implied by this approach might permit laws
which forbid, for instance, marquee displays advertising a
sexually oriented movie. The movie itself could not properly
be limited regardless of its content, as long as it gave
clear warning to those who entered as to its exact nature.
But if a passerby could not avoid being confronted with
scenes from the film, the theater could be held liable for
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that kind of advertising. What this approach contemplates
then is "obscenity" law based totally on the concept of
pandering as discussed in Ginzburg
.
That is precisely the system adopted by the Oregon
legislature when it passed a revised Criminal Code in 1971.
Part of the new code is an obscenity law patterned after
that recommended by Richard Kuh in his book, Foolish
li&le^ivesj Pornogra2h^^_in^d-out of Court
. The Oregon
Law prohibits furnishing obscene materials to minors
(Sect. 256); sending obscene materials to minors (sect. 258);
displaying obscene materials to minors (sect. 259); and pub-
licly displaying nudity or sex for advertising purposes
(sect. 261). The law defines obscenity as any one of the
following: nudity; "slang words currently generally re-
jected for regular use in mixed society;" sado-masochistic
abuse; sexual conduct; or sexual excitement. Each of these
terms is in defined with, I think, a good deal of precision.
For example, nudity, is defined as
uncovered, or less than opaquely covered,
post-pubertal human genitals, pubic areas,
the post-pubertal human female breast be-
low a point immediately above the top of
the areola, or the covered human male geni-
tals in a discernably turgid state. For
purposes of this definition, a female
breast is considered uncovered if the
nipple only or the nipple and the areola
only are covered."^
I think this kind of statute avoids the problems Justice
Brennan feels are inherent in obscenity law. Oregon's
statute is not vague and provides clear guidance as to
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precisely what conduct is prohibited. While one may argue
with the values reflected in the various definitions, they
at least avoid the use of terms like "patently offensive"
and "prurient." In addition, the law does not seek to regu-
late the private viewing or reading habits of consenting
adults. It treats obscenity solely in terms of an intrusion
and as Kuh states
Were legislative enactment to succeed indriving objectionable items from public
view, while permitting adults privately
to buy, to read, to see, or to hear far
more objectionable materials, the meaning-
ful rights of all would be reconciled The
majority would be spared the discomfort ofbeing forcibly confronted by the depersonal-
izing, the embarrassing, the crude; the
minority would, as part of the same legis-
lative framework, be freed to enjoy more of
what it wished, quietly and without fan-fare.^
Justice Brennan's approach in Slaton can be summarized
as follows. He rejects the regulation of expression on the
basis of its allegedly obscene content. That kind of expres-
sion cannot be defined with enough precision to avoid three
major problems: (1) the inevitable censoring of materials
that warrant First Amendment protection; (2) the failure to
provide fair notice as to exactly what kind of expression is
prohibited; (3) the creation of severe internal division
within the Supreme Court and between that body and lower
courts. To overcome these problems Brennan would require a
system in which regulation of sexually oriented materials
focus on the conduct of those distributing such material.
Limitation of that conduct would be justified only when it
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led to unwarranted intrusion into one's privacy. Obviously,
such an approach is not without problems. But it is equally
clear that use of some form of Justice Brennan's design
would overcome many of the serious First Amendment problems
generated by the vagueness of Roth and its prgeny.
The most consistent theme in all of Justice Brennan's
obscenity opinions is his attempt to insure that protected
expression is not censored along with the obscene. After 17
years of frustration with trying to fashion "sensitive
tools" to separate obscene from non-obscene expression he
simply surrendered the effort because, he felt, the task
could not be accomplished. What he recommends as an alter-
native approach is one which treats obscenity primarily in
terms of the use to which it is put rather than as a problem
of evaluating the content of expression. In short, obscenity,
whatever it may be, is subject to limitation, not as a form
of expression but only when its use constitutes an invasion
of privacy. Justice Brennan's shift to this position brings
him very close to the absolutism of Black and Douglas at
least in so far as obscenity censorship is concerned. As
such, it is clearly one of the more significant evidences of
his concern that expression be as unfettered as possible.
CHAPTER II
JUSTICE BRENNAN AND LIBEL
Libel law is designed to afford the individual some
protection against defamatory communication. An injured
party can attempt to recover damages for harm inflicted and.
in states with criminal libel laws, the government may
choose to prosecute the alleged libellor. It is clear then
that libel, as a means of directly punishing expression,
raises First Amendment questions. But Justice Brennan and
the Court did not deal with the general area of libel but
instead with somewhat narrower questions. During the
period covered herein, twelve of the seventeen libel cases
decided by the Court involved alleged defamation of govern-
86ment officials. The five remaining cases concerned
people who, while not working for government, were, for some
87
reason, in the public eye.
As in the obscenity censorship cases, Justice Brennan
played a major role in giving voice to the Court's position
regarding libel. Of the seventeen decisions handed down be-
tween 1957 and 1974, Brennan wrote the majority or lead
opinion in five cases and also clearly influenced the one
88per curiam opinion in the group. But, as we shall see,
these figures alone do not reflect the very substantial
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contribution he has ™ade to libel law and First Amendment
theory.
Justice Brennan's opinions in this area of law deal
primarily with two overlapping issues: the extent of First
Amendment protection afforded critics of government, and the
right of the press to publish, and the people to know,
matters of public interest. As a result, his libel
opinions constitute some of the more important statements
of what Brennan views as the "central meaning" of the First
Amendment. And perhaps his most important statement of all
is contained in the first case to be considered here. New
York Times v. Sullivan
.
The action reviewed in New York Times was initiated
by L. B. Sullivan, a county commissioner of Montgomery
County, Alabama. Sullivan claimed he had been libelled by
an advertisement in the Times which discussed civil rights
activities in Alabama. Several of the statements in the
91ad were false. The trial jury awarded Sullivan $500,000
in damages. That decision was upheld by the Supreme Court
of Alabama against the Times ' contention that such awards
constituted an unconstitutional invasion of freedom of press.
In arriving at their decisions, Alabama courts had ap-
plied a rule of law which held that libel was unprotected by
the First Amendment, that false communications were likewise
unprotected, that injury to official reputation \<ras a basis
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for a recovery and that truth was a proper defense. But for
a unanimous Supreme Court, the entire rule was defective.
In holding that libel was not afforded constitutional
protection, the Alabama courts had relied on several rulings
of the United States Supreme Court. ^2 But it was clear,
Brennan asserted for the Court, that none of these decisions
upheld the use of libel as a means of regulating criticism
of the conduct of government.
In deciding the question now, we are compelledby neither precedent nor policy to give any
more weight to the epithet "libel" than wehave to other "mere labels" of state law.[Ljibel can claim no talismanic immunity from
constitutional limitations. It must be mea-
sured by standards that satisfy the First
Amendment
.
The First Amendment, for Brennan, had as its central purpose
the assurance of free debate on public issues, debate which
"... may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes un-
pleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials."
The advertisement in question, he said, was an expression of
protest on a significant social issue and as such x^as af-
forded constitutional protection unless that protection was
to be voided by the falsity of statements in the ad.
But Justice Brennan also rejected this second feature
of the Alabama rule. The First Amendment had never been
viewed as protecting only "true" statements. False state-
ments were inevitable in a free debate, Brennan said, and
must therefore be protected if expression was to have the
necessary "breathing space" to survive.
The fact that criticism of an official was effective
and damaged his reputation was also insufficient justifica-
tion for limiting expression. Government officials, city
commissioners among them, are to be treated as "
. [ . men
of fortitude, able to thrive in a hardy climate.
. .
."95
For Justice Brennan, the history of the Sedition Act
of 1798 indicated that the combination of these last two
elements, factual error and defamatory content, also failed
as justifications for limiting criticism of government. The
Sedition Act, which in Brennan' s words. "... first crysta-
lized a national awareness of the central meaning of the
First Amendment .", 56 had been condemned by Jefferson and
Madison, by Justices of the Supreme Court, and by students
of the Constitution.
These views reflect a broad consensus that
the Act, because of the restraint it im-
posed upon criticism of government and pub-lic officials, was inconsistent with the
First Amendment. 9/
The limitations that were now seen to render the Sedition
Act unconstitutional were applicable to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment, and it does not matter at all that
a state may permit restrictions on speech to be imposed
through civil suit rather than criminal prosecutions. For
Brennan, the crucial point was that the restrictions xv^ere
effected. The means are irrelevant. Requiring truth in
criticism, Brennan declared, would inhibit the critic. He
would hesitate to attack government because of fear of a
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libel action and awareness of the difficulties involved in
proving the truth of all of his statements. Legislation or
co™>on law rules producing such a system of self-censorship
are therefore contrary to the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. To forbid such unconstitutional restrictions without
creating an absolute constitutional bar against all libel
suits, by public officials, Justice Brennan announced what
has become kno™ as the "New York Times Rule", the rule
which summarized all his objections to the Alabama rule at
issue here.
The constitutional guarantees require, we
think a federal rule that prohibits a pub-
lic official from recovering damages for adefamatory falsehood relating to his of-
ficial conduct unless he proves that the
statement was made with "actual malice"--
that is, with knowledge that it was false
or V7ith reckless disregard of whether it
was false or not. 98
Justice Brennan felt that the privilege created by this rule
was "analogous" to that created in Barr v. Matteo.^^ That
case had extended an absolute privilege to the statements of
a government official when they were made as part of his
official responsibilities.-^^^ But, of course, the New York
Times privilege is conditional, not absolute, and thus the
protection afforded the citizen critic and that available to
101the official are not identical. Nevertheless, even under
the New York Times rule, Sullivan did not have grounds to
recover damages
.
Justice Brennan' s New York Times rule has the effect
cases
-C
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of creating a constitutional standard for all libel
involving criticism of the official conduct of public
officials. And as Harry Kalven points out, the Court in
this case was "compelled" to reach this result.
^^^^^
Alabama had tried to do was to punish an unpopular view, the
pro-civil-rights policy of the New_Yor^Times. by allowing
the award of monetary judgments which, if upheld as consti-
tutional, could, in this case, have driven the paper into
bankruptcy, and could have been employed against any news-
paper voicing an opinion contrary to that favored by the
citizens of a state who were likely to make up juries in
civil or criminal cases.
Before examining Justice Brennan's Times interpreta-
tion of the First Amendment, several points should be made.
First, one must keep in mind the "discrete context" in which
the actual malice standard was formulated. It is a rule to
be applied in libel cases brought by government officials
against citizen-critics of their official conduct. It says
nothing about criticism of an official's private life.
Justice Brennan did not make that distinction explicit until
a few months after Times when, in his Garrison "'"^^ opinion
he wrote
We recognize that different interests may be
involved where purely private libels, totally
unrelated to public affairs, are concerned;
therefore nothing we say today is to be taken
as intimating any views as to the impact of
the constitutional guarantees in the discrete
area of purely private libels. ^^4
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But the difficulty here is where to draw the line. Surely,
there are facets of an official's private life which bear
significantly on the performance of his official duties and
would therefore seem to be germane to a discussion of
"public affairs." And, obviously, providing such a public-
private distinction priori is impossible. Consequently,
the potential critic cannot be sure ahead of time whether or
not his criticism is covered by the Times privilege. More-
over, the Times privilege, even where it applies, is not
absolute. If the comments are made with "actual malice"--
knowing falsehood or reckless disregard of the truth--they
may properly be the basis for the award of damages. At
the same time, the comments of a government official,
speaking within his official responsibilities, are protected
by an absolute privilege. Justice Brennan has commented
that the citizen-critic has as much a "duty to criticize" as
an official has to administer. But the conditional privi-
lege he creates in Times does not equip the citizen with
equal tools with which to perform his function.
While the Times case concerned the use of civil libel
laws against critics of government. Justice Brennan made it
clear that the same principles would apply to criminal
106libel --in short, that the state could not punish one who
had libelled a government official unless the criticism was
motivated by actual malice. Thomas Emerson has commented
the Sedition Act of 1798 applied only to
'false' utterances, made with 'intent' to
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tftZr T^^.^?^°-^^cing the constitutionalityof that legislation the Supreme Court neversuggested It would have been valid had itclearly applied only to 'deliberate or reck-less falsehood ' The fact seems to be that
A^^^^^S''i'? °f in Garrison ands_hton had failed to distinguIilTbit^een theuse oT criminal libel laws as seditious libel
law of'cLiriibe?.JS7'"'"^' supplement to the
What Justice Brennan's application of the Times rule in
^^^^^^^^ t^^^ to severely narrow the grounds upon
which the state can properly punish a critic of government.
But it does not entirely eliminate such state power.
The fact that Justice Brennan does not call for an
absolute privilege in either New York Times or Garrison is
a result of his view of the First Amendment. He feels that
the basic purpose, or "central meaning," as he says, of the
First Amendment is to insure free public discussion of sig-
nificant issues, particularly the operations of government.
This is the reason, he feels, that the Sedition Act of 1793
has been rejected by a "broad consensus." The First Amend-
ment shelters debate even when it is unpleasant, unpopular,
or, in some cases, when it is false. "'^^ The Amendment must
reach this far, he feels, if government is to be made re-
sponsive to the people and if the people are to retain the
povzer to make the changes they desire through critical dis-
cussion of public issues.
And it is that kind of discussion that Justice Brennan
seeks to protect in Times and Garrison . The protection af-
forded the expression in those cases exists not because of
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the status of the -np-rQnr^o aa ^ i ,cn persons discussed but rather because of
the function performed by that kind of discussion. In
other words, Justice Brennan's Times rule protects one of
the tools of self-government. But actual malice does not
serve that end.
Calculated falsehood falls into that classof utterances which "are no essential partof any exposition of ideas, and are of
such slight social value as a step totruth that any benefit that may be derivedtrom them is clearly outweighed by socialinterest in order and morality. ..."
* j -Hence the knowingly false statement
and the false statement made with recklessdisregard of the truth, do not enjoy con-
stitutional protection. 109
One year after writing the above, Justice Brennan enlarged
on this point in delivering the Alexander Meiklejohn lecture
at Brown University."'""''^
Note that the New York Times principle has
an important qualification: it does not
bar civil or criminal libel actions for
false criticism of the official conduct of
a public official if that criticism is made
with knox^^ledge of its falsity or in reck-
less disregard of whether it was false or
true. The underpinning of that qualifica-,
,
tion is the 'redeeming social value' test.
Brennan 's Times- Garrison privilege is conditional then be-
cause actual malice, like obscenity, contributes little
to the interchange of ideas and therefore does not warrant
First Amendment Protection.
One difficulty with this view has been pointed out by
Justice Marshall in his dissent in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia ."'""'
In order for particular defamation to come
within the privilege there must be a
determination that the event was of legiti-mate public interest. That determination
and ir?f.'°i^^ generally
? ^^^^ analysis, by this Courtin particular.
. . . [CJourts will be re-quired to somehow pass on the legitimacy ofinterest m a particular event or subjectwnat information is relevant to self-government.
... The danger such a doctrine
r P"--^ en L .
In short, the actual malice rule leaves the door open for
limitation of criticism of government. Of course, the only
way to avoid that possibility is to adopt Justice Black's
view that all libel laws violate the First Amendment
.
But in libel, as in obscenity. Justice Brennan stops just
short of the absolutist view.
Justice Brennan did not attempt to define "public
official" in either Times or Garrison
. But he did confront
that issue two years later in Rosenblatt v. Baer . -^-^^
Before the Supreme Court, Baer had argued that the
question as to whether he was a public official within New
York Times should be resolved by state standards. Justice
Brennan rejected that view, stating that its recognition
would result in constitutional protection varying with state
lines. At the same time he refused to give any precise
definition of "public official" because he insisted this
case did not require such a definition. The purpose of the
New York Times rule was to insure wide open discussion of
public policy and of persons responsible for it.
It is clear, therefore, that the "public
official" designation applies at the very
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lltl^ a'^ong the hierarchy of govern-ment employees who have, or appea? to fhlpublic to have, substantial control over theconduct of governmental affairs. 117
In a footnote, Justice Brennan added to that definition:
The employee's position must be one whichwould mvite public scrutiny and discussionof the person holding it, entirely apartfrom the scrutiny and discussion occasionedby the particular charges in controversy . 118
If an individual fell under this definition, he was a public
official within the meaning of the New York Times rule and,
consequently, statements directed at him must meet the
knowing falsity or reckless-disregard-for-truth standard
before damages could properly be awarded.
It would be useful here to examine the components of
Justice Brennan' s definition of "public official". Clearly,
it is one of the critical elements in the New York Times
rule. Initially, it should be understood that Brennan sees
his definition as minimal, or, in his own words, that it ap-
plies "at the very least" to the group he designates. This
means, of course, that even those who fall outside the
Rosenblatt definition might be brought within the concept of
"public official". For Brennan, a public official is, first
of all, and most obviously, one who is employed by govern-
ment. That employee must have "substantial responsibility"
for policy. Even if the employee only appears to have re-
sponsibility for policy, he is still within the Brennan
119definition. All of this would seem to indicate an ex-
tremely broad definition which could conceivably include
almost all government employees. But, in the footnote to
his opinion quoted above. Justice Brennan adds a significant
limitation. The employee's position, he said, must be one
which is the subject of public discussion in normal times-
apart from a particular controversy. m short, it would seem
that the Times rule does not become operative when contro-
versy surrounds a government employee who would not be the
subject of discussion except in the context of a specific
controversy. Justice Brennan justifies this limit on his
public official definition by stating that it is required if
the social interest in protecting reputation is not to be
ignored.
One potential problem with Brennan' s limitation here
is that it is precisely during controversy that the greatest
latitude for discussion is required. VThile it is unlikely,
it is possible that an unnoticed government employee, one
who was not the subject of public discussion in normal
times, could become involved in a controversy having conse-
quences for public policy. But under the limitation Brennan
places on his own definition, expression in such a case is
not afforded the full protection of the New York Times rule.
Probably in such a situation Brennan would resort to
weighing the social significance of the controversy against
the interest in protecting the employee's reputation.
Given Brennan' s view of the role of free expression in a
democratic system, the balance almost surely would be struck
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in favor of an "unfettered interchange of ideas."
Justice Brennan's opinion also attempts to clarify
the relationship between the privilege in Barr and the pri-
vilege created by NewYork^i^^. justice Brennan seemed t
make this connection himself in his Times opinion. Speaking
of the Times rule he said,
Such a privilege for criticism of official
conduct is appropriately analogous to theprotection accorded a public official xvhenhe IS sued for libel by a private citizenIn Barr v. Matteo,
. .
. this Court held
the utterance of a federal official to be
absolutely privileged if made 'within the
outer perimeter' of his duties. The
reason for the official privilege is said tobe that the threat of damage suits would
otherwise inhibit the fearless, vigorous,
and effective administration of policies
of government' and dampen the ardor of allbut the most resolute, or the most irre-
sponsible in the unflinching discharge of
their duties. Barr v. Matteo
.
Analogous considerations support the privi-
lege for the citizen-critic of government.
It is as much his duty to criticize as it
is the official's duty to administer . i20
Brennan draws the same analogy in his Garrison opinion
.
But in Rosenblatt
,
Justice Brennan states that official pri-
vilege and citizen privilege are not tied to one another
.
The New York Times rule, he said, seeks to protect discussion
and not "retaliation." The reference to Barr "... should
be taken to mean no more than that the scope of the privi-
lege is to be determined by reference to the function it
serves.
"^^^
What Brennan means here is simply that the Barr and
New York Times privileges exist for the purpose of insuring
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effective government and effective public participation there-
in, and not to provide adversaries with similar weapons. For
him, the governed and those who govern each have functions
to perform, both of which can be aided by allowing them
realtively free discussion.
Justice Brennan's basic goal in New York Times and
Garrison was to protect the free flow of information. In
order to achieve that goal his New York Time s rule was
fashioned to protect innocent error. But the New York Times
rule applies only to libel of public officials by critics of
their official conduct. But of course freedom of expression
and the free flow of information can be limited by means
other than libel suits filed by public officials or criminal
prosecutions of the critics of public officials. Justice
Brennan confronted such a situation in Time Inc
. v. Hill.-*-^^
In 1952, James Hill and his family were held hostage
in their home by three escaped convicts. After nineteen
hours, they were released unharmed. In his comments follow-
ing release. Hill emphasized that the convicts had treated
all of his family well and that there had been no violence.
Moving to Connecticut shortly after the apprehension of the
convicts. Hill discouraged further publicity. The year
following the incident, a novel was published. The Desperate
Hours, which depicted an experience similar to that of the
Hills except that the convicts in the book were violent to-
ward their captives. The book was then made into a play.
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A Life magazine story about the play became the subject of
this case.
1.S-
ome
s
Life had run a story in February, 1955, which d
cussed the opening of the play and carried pictures of s
of the scenes photographed at the house in which the Hill
had been held captive. The text accompanying the pictures
stated that the play had been "inspired" by the Hill inci-
dent. Mr. Hill then brought suit in New York courts, under
a state law protecting privacy, charging that Life had
falsely connected the play with his experience. He eventu-
ally won $30,000 in damages.
New York Courts had treated Hill as a "newsworthy"
person. Under the prevailing interpretation of the state's
privacy law, such persons were entitled to recover damages i
reports of their activities were "fictitious". Justice
Brennan felt that the law could not escape constitutional
infirmity unless it required proof of knowing or reckless
falsity before damages could be awarded. The protection af-
forded free expression is not reserved for political affairs
only. The exposure the Hills experienced was, from Brennan'
point of view, a consequence of living in a society vzhich
places great value on free public discussion. The Life
article at issue was "a matter of public interest." For
Brennan, discussion of that sort inevitably contained some
error. And innocent error must be protected if expression
is to perform its vital functions.
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What Justice Brennan did in the Hill case was to im-
pose the "actual malice" rule on privacy suits filed by
newsworthy persons. As he pointed out, this was not a
"blind application" of the Times rule for that rule applies
only in libel suits filed by public officials. But the
basic problem, the interruption in the free flow of informa-
tion, was the same in Hill as in Times. In the former, the
device employed to impose that limitation was a privacy
action, in the latter, a libel suit. But, for Justice
Brennan, what is important is not the nature of the device
used to impose the restriction but simply the fact that
speech has been limited. Free expression required the same
degree of protection in both cases since it was performing
the same function--facilitating discussion of issues of pub-
lic interest.
The question of whether the Times rule was to apply
to libel suits filed by someone other than a public official
was not raised until three years after the initial formula-
tion of the standard. The Court dealt with that issue in
Curtis Publishing Company v. Butts and Associated Press v.
T 125Walker
.
Wallace Butts was employed by a private corpora-
tion as athletic director at the University of Georgia. He
brought suit against the Saturday Evening Post
,
published by
Curtis Publishing Company, based on a Post article which
alleged that he had fixed a football game between Georgia
and Alabama by giving the Alabama coach, Paul Bryant, cer-
tain plays Georgia had planned to use. The trial in U. S.
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District Court was completed before the New_Yorl^Times deci-
sion was announced. Curtis offered no c^^I^^^^^^J^^^
fenses, depending entirely on the defense of truth. In part
of his charge to the jury, the judge made the award of puni-
tive damages dependent on a finding of actual malice, which
he defined as "
'
.
. .
the notion of ill will, spite, hatred
and an intent to injure one. Malice also denotes a wanton
or reckless indifference of culpable negligence with regard
to the rights of others. "'126 ^^^^
.^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^^^
awarding $60,000 compensatory damages and $400,000 punitive
damages. Curtis' motion for a new trial was denied and the
Court of Appeals affirmed.
The Walker case involved an Associated Press news
dispatch concerning the activities of retired General Edwin
Walker at the University of Mississippi during disturbances
over integration of the University. The A. P. report stated
that Walker had "assumed command" of a mob and had led a
charge against federal marshals. Walker filed a libel suit
in Texas courts seeking a total of $2,000,000 in compensa-
tory and punitive damages. A. P. based its defense on truth
and on constitutional defenses. The jury was instructed that
it could award compensatory damages if the dispatch was not
substantially true and that punitive damages could be added
if the article was motivated by ill will, bad or evil
motive or entire want of care. The jury awarded $500,000
compensatory damages and $300,000 punitive damages. But the
trial judge refused to enter the punitive award because, in
his view, no actual malice was indicated. Both sides ap-
pealed to the Texas Court of Civil Appeals which affirmed.
The Supreme Court of Texas denied a writ of error.
Justice Harlan's lead opinion presents an interesting
alternative approach to that of Justice Brennan and will
therefore be examined in some detail.
Harlan felt that freedom of expression is important
both for society and for the individual. Socially, freedom
of expression helps maintain our political system while at
the same time permitting each man to state his opinion. But
even though free expression is important, it is not un-
limited. Limitations can be imposed when the rights and
liberties of others are infringed. Yet not all forms of
limitation are acceptable.
Our touchstones are that acceptable limita-
tions must neither affect 'the impartial dis-
tribution of news' and ideas.
. . , nor be-
cause of their historical impact constitute
a special burden on the press,
. . . , nor
deprive our free society of the stimulating
benefit of varied ideas because their pur-
veyors fear physical or economic retribution
solely because of what they choose to think
and publish. 127
The history of libel law made it clear, for Harlan, that
there was a basic conflict between it and the American tra-
dition of free expression. Libel had been changed because
of that conflict but the basic antithesis remained, since
libel still "... limits the freedom of the publisher to
express certain sentiments at least without guaranteeing
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legal proof of their substantial accuracy . "128 ^^^^.^^
alone was not enough to remove a publisher's protection,
Harlan stated. The Court had so indicated in New York iin.es
and in Hill. But protection did cease when thTT^^^^TT^
cated that a publisher had conducted himself improperly and
thereby created a false publication. The Times decision,
Harlan said, made it clear that libel judgments based on
misconduct were constitutionally permissible. The benefit
of this approach, for Harlan, is that it permits limitation
on expression which could be "neutral with respect to the
content of the speech."
But while he saw the Times decision as providing some
guidance in Curtis and Associated Press , he felt that the
critical elements of Times were absent. While the Times
case involved analogies to seditious libel, none were pre-
sent in the instant cases, and neither Curtis nor the A. P.
were entitled to special protection for their utterances.
Since the context of these cases was different than that of
Times, the Court, said Harlan, was required to rely on a
standard other than the Times rule. That standard was pro-
vided by the prevailing rules of liability
with respect to compensation of persons
injured by the improper performance of a
legitimate activity by another. Under these
rules, a departure from the kind of care so-
ciety may expect from a reasonable man per-
forming such activity leaves the actor open
to a judicial shifting of loss. In defining
these rules
. . . courts have consistently
given much attention to the importance of
defendants' activities . ^29
As well as focusing on a defendant's activities, courts also
have examined the plaintiffs position in order to determine
whether he was properly calling on the court for protection
given his "prior activities and means of self defense."
For Harlan, the material in question in Curtis and
^^l^£i^ted_Press was of legitimate interest to the public.
Further, both Butts and Walker were public figures within
ordinary libel law and both also had access to means of
self-defense against published charges. Given this type of
case, involving public figures, the states, Harlan felt,
could not be left free to devise whatever type of libel law
they felt necessary. IThat was required was some "constitu-
tional safeguard."
We consider and would hold that a
"public figure" who is not a public offi-
cial may also recover damages for defama-
tory falsehood whose substance makes sub-
stantial danger to reputation apparent,
on a showing of highly unreasonable con-
duct constituting an extreme departure
from the standards of investigation and
reporting ordinarily adhered to by re-
sponsible publishers . 130
Using this standard, Harlan found that the conduct of Curtis
Publishing was an "extreme departure" from the investigatory
standards followed by responsible publishers
. The A. P.,
on the other hand, had not acted improperly. Consequently,
the judgment for Butts was upheld x^hile the award to Walker
was reversed and remanded.
Harry Kalven has commented that the Curtis -A. P.
opinion represents Harlan in " . . . his familiar role as the
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Justice who, in the aftermath of a fresh burst of energy by
the court, comes forward to tidy things up."132
opinion in these cases is quite a bit more than just a clari-
fication of New York Times. What Harlan did in Curtis-A.P
.
was to expand on his own concurring- dissenting opinion in
133Time V. Hill, thereby making a significant departure from
the Times rule.
He would have the Court employ a sliding scale of
press privilege based upon the evaluation of several ele-
ments: the proximity to seditious libel, the status of the
alleged libellant, and his related ability to respond to
134falsity. Harlan would provide the most extensive privi-
lege in cases involving public officials. There, the Times
rule would apply. But as one moves away from cases analogous
to seditious libel, the privilege shrinks. In effect, Harlan
would apply three different standards: the Times rule where
public officials are involved, a standard of gross negligence
in cases involving public figures, and a fair comment rule
when private persons involuntarily become newsworthy. The
purpose of Harlan's calculus is to insure a competition of
ideas. Consequently, the degree of protection afforded ex-
pression is pegged to the ability of the two "combatants" to
respond to each others' arguments.
/justice Brennan's brief opinion explained his concur-
rence in the disposition of A. P
.
and his dissent in Curtis
He agreed with Chief Justice Warren's view that the Times
rule should apply to both public officials and public
figures. Since the lower court decision in was clearly
inconsistent with Ti^, reversal was required. But he would
have had the Court remand Curtis despite his view that the
evidence would support a judgment for Butts under the
"actual malice" standard. Brennan's concern in Butts was
with the judge's charge to the jury, which he felt was not
consistent with NewJ^ork^i^. The charge failed, he said,
for two reasons. First, while allowing damages if actual
malice was present, the trial judge defined actual malice,
in. part, as encompassing ill will or hatred. This meant
that the motive of expression was made relevant, and he and
the majority had rejected that view in Garrison
. Second,
Brennan indicated that the trial judge allowed the Post to
show, in mitigation of damages, that it had relied in good
faith on its sources. This resulted in the jury being author-
ized to award some damages even though the Post had acted in
good faith. That, he said, was inconsistent with the Times
ruling. Because of these defects in the instructions,
Brennan would have required a jury to make the decision in
^^^tis with a proper charge even though he felt that the
ultimate resolution of the case could be the same.
The basic difference between Justices Brennan
and Harlan is that Brennan views freedom of expression as
the most important interest to be preserved while Harlan
views it as simply one of many important interests to be
protected. Four years after the Curtis decision. Justice
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Harlan stated
Just as an automobile negligently drivencan cost a person his physical and mentalwell being and the fruits of his labo?so can a printing press negligently set.^^^
In short, the publisher is dealt with as is any other tort-
feasor. But Justice Brennan views the press as having a
uniquely critical role to play in the free interchange of
ideas. Consequently, he would have the Times rule protect
the press be it public official or public figure who is dis-
cussed. And that is due to his focus on the function of ex-
pression in each case rather than the status of the people
involved.
It should be noted here that the voting alignment in
Butts and A. P. produced a rather curious result. There was
no majority opinion in Butts
. Justice Harlan's opinion,
joined by Clark, Stewart and Fortas, rejected application of
the Times rule to public figures. Instead he would require
such persons to prove gross negligence on the part of the
publisher before damages could be awarded. Chief Justice
Warren concurred but only to carry the decision for Butts.
He felt that the Times rule should apply to public figures.
Justice Brennan, joined by White, felt that the judge's charge
to the jury did not comport with Time s and therefore dis-
sented. Justices Black and Douglas dissented calling for
the rejection of Times in toto to be replaced by an absolute
privilege. In A. P.
,
the Court voted unanimously to reverse
the awarding of damages. The Chief Justice, speaking for
57
le
:as
Brennan and White, held that the Times rule had not been met
Black and Douglas concurred, making Warren's opinion th.
majority view. Justices Harlan, Clark, Stewart and Fort,
also concurred, but on the grounds that the A.P. had not
been guilty of gross negligence. To sunnnarize, Justices
Harlan, Clark, Stewart, White, Fortas, Brennan and the Chief
Justice felt that Butts and Walker were public figures.
Brennan, White, Warren, Black, and Douglas voted in A^^ to
make the Times rule applicable to individuals so defined.
But, in Butts, Justi.^es Harlan, Clark, Stewart and Fortas
viewed New York Times as limited in reach to public offi-
cials only and sustained the awarding of damages to Butts on
the grounds of Curtis' "extreme departure from the standards
of investigation and reporting normally adhered to." The
net result of these differences was that the Court had
ruled that the Times rule applied to public figures when, as
in A^, libel judgments were reversed, but did not apply to
public figures when, as in Butts
, libel judgments were sus-
tained.
The important element of these cases for this study
is, of course. Justice Brennan' s vote to extend the "actual
malice" rule of New York Times to libel cases filed by pub-
lic figures. But, as has been pointed out, the status of
those filing libel suits was not, for Brennan, what defined
the scope of the privilege. Rather he sought to protect
136discussion of public issues. In this regard his views in
58
Butts and bring him closer to those of Justi,
Douglas. '-^^
-ce
-ons
Curtis and Butts were the last major libel decisi.
handed down during Earl Warren's tenure on the Court. ^^8
The resignation of the Chief Justice in 1969 marked the be-
ginning of a period of frequent changes in the membership of
the Court. By 1971, when the Court made its decision in
Rosenbloom,139 ^^^^ ^^.^^ ^.^^^ decision to date, two
new Justices had taken their seats: Warren Burger had been
appointed Chief Justice and Harry Blackmun had assumed the
seat vacated by Justice Fortas. As we shall see, the two new
members of the Court were to play a critical role in a signi-
ficant extension of the "actual malice" rule.
Before turning to a discussion of Rosenbloom
.
brief
mention should be made of several of the court's libel
rulings immediately preceding that case. While none of them
can be considered as significant as Rosenbloom
,
they did help
to make the Times rule somewhat more specific.
Perhaps the most unique case in this group was a case
the Court refused to hear, Ginzburg v. Goldwater
. The
Justices allowed to stand a Circuit Court of Appeals ruling"'"'^^-'-
that Senator Barry Goldwater had been libelled by an article
in Fact magazine, whose publisher was Ginzburg, published
during the 1964 presidential campaign. In that article, it
was stated that Goldwater was a "paranoid personality" and
therefore unfit for the Presidency. The Court of Appeals
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held that since Ginzburg neither sought nor himself possessed
the expertise to reach such a conclusion, publication of
such a charge constituted "actual malice" as defined in the
Times case. Justice Black, joined by Douglas, added a
written dissent to the Court's memorandum decision. Black
pointed out that while the Circuit Court's ruling exempli-
fied the inadequacy of the Times standard, two additional
factors made the lower court's decision "all the more op-
pressive and ominous." At the time the article was pub-
lished, Goldwater was the Republican presidential nominee.
For Black, untrue statements during a campaign were "in-
evitable and perhaps essential." Further, the damages
awarded were totally punitive}^^ indicating that the jury
did not find the article damaging. In fact, Goldwater him-
self did not claim he had been damaged. For Black, the
proper course was to hear the case, reject New York Times
and extend an absolute privilege to discuss public
affairs.
Justice Brennan joined Justice Stewart's majority
opinion in the four other cases immediately preceding
Rosenbloom
.
Handed down during the 1969-1970 and 1970-1971
terms, these decisions held that: (1) a public figure could
not recover damages under a rule of liability which did not
require a showing of actual malice ; ''"'^'^ (2) publications
concerning candidates for public office are shielded by the
privilege created in New York Times
,
and the privilege
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extends to "a-ything which might touch on
.
.
. fUness for
o"-ce
; (3) a finding of actual malice requires a showing
that the publisher had serious doubts about the truth of his
publication. (4) the failure of a lower court to consider
the Times rule in a libel suit brought by a public official
required reversal of that court's decision. Brennan's
silence ended with Ros_enbloom v. Metromedia, ^^^^.^
now turn.
George Rosenbloom was a distributor of nudist maga-
zines in Philadelphia. During a city campaign against ob-
scenity, Rosenbloom was arrested for possession of obscene
literature, and a quantity of the material was seized. His
libel suit was based, in part, on a radio report of that
arrest. In describing the event, the reporter failed to
describe the seized books as "allegedly" obscene, an omis-
sion that was corrected in later broadcasts. Rosenbloom and
some of his distributor colleagues then sought an injunction
against local officials. Again, the radio station, in re-
porting that story, referred to the plaintiffs as "smut
peddlers" v7ho V7ere trying to force local officials to "lay
off the smut literature racket." In a separate action, a
state court subsequently held the seized books not obscene.
Apparently feeling that this finding gave him adequate
grounds on which to institute a suit, Rosenbloom sued the
radio station claiming that he had been defamed by the two
radio broadcasts in question.
The District Court's handling of the case raised the
xssue Which was to be of central concern to the Supreme
court. The lower court reasoned that since Rosenbloom was
neither a public official nor a public figure, the Ti^es re-
quirement of actual malice did not apply. instead the jury
was instructed in accordance with Pennsylvania libel law
which permitted recovery of damages if it could be shown
that falsehoods had been published without reasonable care
being taken to ascertain their truth. Rosenbloom was awarded
geueral and punitive damages but, on appeal, the Circuit
Court reversed, holding that the Times rule was in fact ap-
plicable, and that the evidence could not sustain a finding
for Rosenbloom under that standard.
Justice Brennan delivered the lead opinion joined by
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun. For him the
issue was clear--whether the "actual malice" standard ap-
plied to private persons as well as to public figures and
public officials. While New York Times and its progeny had
referred to the status of the individuals discussed,
Brennan indicated that those decisions most importantly
dealt with issues of "public or general interest." In short,
he maintained that while the Court had focused on the status
of individuals, the determining factor was actually the
nature of the issue involved. Free discussion of all public
issues was necessary, he said, since
Self governance in the United States pre-
supposes far more than knowledge and debate
about the strictly official activities of
Te'utTf Ir^' °' government. The'co'L?'-
^TUr.ri
country to the institution ofprivate property, protected by the DueProcess and Just Compensation Clauses in
vast ar'^^^''f^°''' P^^^^^ P^^^^te handseas of economic and social powerthat vitally affect the nature and qualityot life m the nation. Our efforts to liveand work together in a free society not
completely dominated by governmental regu-lation necessarily encompass far more thanpolitics m a narrow sense. ^'^•^
Since the First Amendment extended to "myriad" matters of
public interest, it was artificial to base the degree of
constitutional protection of expression on the status of the
persons discu-sed. Even in cases in which a private indi-
vidual was involuntarily thrust into discussion of an issue
of public interest, his interest in his privacy was over-
ridden by the necessity that the public have full informa-
tion. So that the law would recognize that necessity,
Brennan announced an extension of the Times rule.
We thus hold that a libel action, as here,
by a private individual against a licensed
radio station for a defamatory falsehood
in a newscast relating to his involvement
in an event of public or general concern may
be sustained only upon clear and convincing
proof that the defamatory falsehood was pub-
lished with knowledge that it was false or
with reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not . -^^^
No other standard, neither "reasonable care" nor negligence,
would provide the required "breathing space" for the First
Amendment. Within this reformulation of the Times rules,
Rosenbloom had no basis for recovery of damages.
A word must be said here about Justice Brennan 's two
supporters in Rosenbloom, chief Justice Burger and Justice
Blackmun. Burger and Blaclonun joined what was. aside from
the absolutist position, the most liberal view on the Court.
But I think it would be an error to assume that this indi-
cates their general agreement with Brennan's view of freedom
of expression. What seems to me a more accurate reflection
of their First Amendment views is found in the Millerl^l
152Slaton cases as well as in several other obscenity deci-
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sions. It IS clear from those opinions, written by the
Chief Justice and joined by Blackmun, that they both object
to what they call "commercial exploitation" of erotica. The
broadcasts to which Rosenbloom objected concerned his al-
leged distribution of such material. In short, it seems to
me that Burger and Blackmun joined Brennan's rejection of
Rosenbloom' s claims because they disapproved of the latter'
s
"sordid business" rather than because they agreed with
Brennan's broad reading of the First Amendment. This of
course means that when a more savory individual presents
similar issues to the Court, Brennan may not be able to at-
tract their support.
Justice Brennan's libel opinions are clearly among
the most significant statements he has made as to the
meaning of the First Amendment. In them he makes clear his
view that the Amendment's basic purpose is to protect the
free flow of information about issues of interest to the
public. And his view of just what constitutes a public
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issue is extremely broad Ac i.^ ^ -j •y D a. s he said m another context:
?^^T.^''°^5''^^°'' S^^^^ speech and press was
of id^affo? interchlnge
oil t^T ' bringing about of politi-
peop?e °^Ati^ "^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^ by thel .
.
.All Ideas having the slightest
idear':^^ r^'^' importanct-unorthodox
^^^^^tro^7eTs±al ideas, even ideashaueful to the prevailing climate of
opinion--have the full protection of theguarantees, unless excludable because theyencroach on the limited area of more impor-tant interests . f54 ^
In libel cases, the only expression lacking social importance
is calculated falsehood-speech resulting from actual malice.
As he did in regard to obscenity, Justice Brennan condemns cal-
culated falsehood to the lower level of Kalven's "two-level-
free-speech-theory"155__^^^^ .
^ ^ ^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^
sideration need be given to the context in which it is used.
That limitation on absolute freedom to discuss public
issues is a very small one indeed. What Justice Brennan has
accomplished with the "actual malice" rule is to make it im-
possible to "accidentally" libel anyone when discussing pub-
lic issues. He has provided protection for innocent error
so that a publisher is aware that unless he knowingly lies
or fails to make any effort at all to verify his statements,
his discussion is shielded by the First Amendment. At the
same time, Brennan has left the door open just enough to per-
mit punishment of expression solely designed to inflict in-
jury. In this sense then, Justice Brennan has struck what
seems to me to be the proper balance between freedom of ex-
pression and the right of the individual to protection from
defamation.
-ews
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CHAPTER III
JUSTICE BRENNAN AND INTERNAL SECURITY
This final chapter examines Justice Brennan's vi<
in several different kinds of freedom of expression cas<
which may be generally categorized as internal security
cases. The organization of this discussion is similar to
that employed by Thomas I. Emerson in his book. The System
of Freedom of Expression. The first section examines
Justice Brennan's approach to the threats to expression
posed by legislative investigations. This is followed by
analysis of his viex7 of the relationship between demonstra-
tions and freedom of expression. Both federal and state
governments have taken various steps to control allegedly
subversive organizations. Two of the means employed, denial
of benefits to members and attempts to limit the suspected
organization's activities, comprise the next two sections of
this study. The concluding section deals with Brennan's
views in several First Amendment cases which do not fit into
any neat classificatory scheme. But his opinions in several
of those cases constitute significant discussion of such
issues as prior restraint of the press, "'"^^ and the right of
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access to the media.
As pointed out earlier in this study. Justice Brennan
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has consistently rejected an absolute interpretation of the
First Amendment. Instead he has attempted to strike a
balance between competing interests. It is in the internal
security area that balancers are perhaps most seriously
tested as to their commitment to that approach. This is so
because the interest most often placed in opposition to fr
expression is the state's interest in self-preservation. As
we will see, several of those Justices who claim to favor the
balancing approach totally abandon it as soon as the state
claims that self-preservation is the interest they seek to
protect through limiting a particular form of expression.
But Justice Brennan is not among that group. His willing-
ness, in fact his insistence, on balancing as the proper ap-
proach is evident in many of the cases to be discussed be-
low. This is particularly true of those involving legisla-
tive investigations, to which we now turn.
Most investigations by legislative committees have
not raised First Amendment issues. But beginning in the
1930 's both federal and state legislatures made increasing
use of committee investigations to inquire into what were
alleged to be subversive activities. Such investigations
necessitated the calling of witnesses who were questioned
as to their political opinions and associations. Inevit-
ably, such persons, whether or not they cooperated with the
committee, were stamped as disloyal and suffered the
predictable consequences. But it was not the witnesses alone
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whose First Amendment rights were infr^-r.. asucb trmged upon. Those who
were fortunate to avoid direct confron^p^^r^-i-A-ecL r ontation with a committee
like the House Committee on Internal Security^59 ^^^^^
help but feel that it was dangerous to express an unorthodox
political view. In short, the existence of such connnittees
most surely has had a chilling effect on expression.
Justice Brennan's initial contact with the First
Amendment issues raised by investigations of subversion came
in the Watkins^^Q and Sweeze^^^l ^^^^^
^^^^
cases he joined in Chief Justice Warren's opinion for the
Court. In Watkins the Court held that a witness before the
House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) could not be
compelled to testify about the alleged Communist Party mem-
bership of others because he had not been informed of the
pertinence of the question to the Committees task. Warren
also stated that the First Amendment imposed limitations on
the power of Congress to investigate. The Court, the Chief
Justice held, must balance Congressional need for the infor-
mation sought against "the individual interest in privacy."
But Warren avoided striking any balance here basing the de-
cision instead on the pertinence issue noted above. In
Sweezey
,
involving an investigation conducted by a state
attorney general, the Chief Justice again relied on due
process grounds to reverse the contempt conviction of a wit-
ness who refused to answer questions relating to a lecture
he gave at the University of New Hampshire. Speaking for
himself and Justices Brennan, Black and Douglas, Warren
6 8
ruled that the authorization for the investigation had
failed to set proper limits on the inquiry.
In both these cases First Amendment issues were recog-
nized by the Court but did not serve as the articulated
bases of the decisions. But at the same time it is clear
that the presence of such considerations lead the Court to
demand that investigating committees proceed with greater
care than might be required if First Amendment rights were
not involved.
Justice Brennan's first written opinion in this area
was his dissent in Uphaus v. W^.162 Millard Uphaus was
executive director of World Fellowship, Inc. which operated
a suimner camp in New Hampshire. The Attorney General of
that state acting, as in Sweezey, as a one man investigating
committee, subpoenaed lists of the camp employees and its
guests. Uphaus refused to produce the lists and was even-
tually jailed for contempt until he was willing to comply.
His conviction was affirmed by the State Supreme Court. The
U. S. Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the
case to the state high court for reconsideration in light of
Sweezey. The state court reaffirmed its original decision
and the case again came before the Supreme Court.
Justice Clark delivered the majority opinion. •'"^^ The
central issue, he felt, was whether the associational privacy
of the persons on the subpoenaed lists was outweighed by the
state's interest in self-preservation. That state interest
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-the ultimate value of any society' and thus it must pre-
vail. Consequently, the investigation in support of that
interest was proper and punishment of Uphaus for refusing to
cooperate with it did not constitute a denial of due process.
Justice Brennan's dissent attacked the majority for
failing to balance the interests in conflict. Unless the
Court was willing to make a "universal" subordination of
speech and association to the state's interest, drawing
the line between the competing values would be difficult.
The problem is one in its nature callingtor traditional case-by-case development
ot principles in the various permutations
ot circumstances where the conflict may
appear, loq- J
For Justice Brennan, the development of the required prin-
ciples was clearly the responsibility of the judiciary.
The majority had failed to fulfill that responsibility be-
cause it had treated the assertion of a state interest by
the legislature as legitimizing the specific means chosen
to support that interest. Brennan's ovm examination of the
circumstances of the case led him to conclude that the only
purpose served by the Attorney General's activities was ex-
posure of suspected subversives. In short, he felt that
there was no valid state interest present here against which
to balance freedom of speech and association. Consequently,
he would have reversed the state court.
As one writer has pointed out, balancing is a
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"much abused doctrine." The mistreatment has come pri-
marily from Justices who profess that it is the proper
method of resolving First Amendment issues and at the same
time really fail to use it. Justice Harlan's opinion in
u V. u. D. exempiities this curxous approach.
On the one hand he states,
^^here First Amendment rights are assertedto bar governmental interrogation resolu-tion of the issue always involves abalancing by the courts of the competingprivate and public interests at stake inthe particular circumstances shown. ^67
But, at the same time when Congress is investigating Commu-
nism in support of the right of self-preservation, that auto-
matically quashes any First Amendment rights that have been
asserted. For Harlan the balance has already been struck by
the legislature and the judiciary cannot substitute its own
judgment. '^^
What Justice Harlan fails to do is critical to a
meaningful balancing process. He really does not examine
the facts in the case to determine whether the recalcitrant
witness in Barenblatt presented an actual threat to the pre-
servation of the government. Surely no one can reasonably
contend that if Barenblatt was in truth a threat to national
security the First Amendment would require the government to
stand back and do nothing, "'"^^ but Harlan never reaches the
point of asking that question. Any judicial protection of
the First Amendment evaporates as soon as Congress asserts
its interest.
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Justice Brennan's use of the balancing approach is
quite different for several reasons. First of all, unlike
Harlan, Brennan does not believe in judicial self restraint.
He is quite willing to employ the Court's power to block
legislative activities he feels are improper. Secondly,
he comes to a weighing of the facts in each case with a pre-
disposition in favor of First Amendment rights. Conse-
quently he demands very clear and convincing evidence that
the investigation serves a legitimate legislative purpose,
and that that goal cannot be achieved in a manner that does
not infringe on First Amendment rights. The clearest in-
dication of that fact is Justice Brennan' s voting pattern
and opinions in the ten cases examined for this section.
In none of them did he vote to uphold the specific assertion
of legislative power. In dissent his most frequent com-
plaint was that the purpose of the particular investigation
was "exposure purely for the sake of exposure." And for
Justice Brennan that is not a purpose significant enough
to limit First Amendment rights.
None of this means that Justice Brennan would abso-
lutely forbid any legislative investigation which infringes
on freedom of expression. Yet none of his own opinions give
clear indication of the conditions under which he would per-
mit such an investigation. However Justice Brennan did join
Justice Goldberg's opinion in Gibson v. Florida Legislative
Investigation Committee
.
"''^^ In that opinion Goldberg held
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that individual and group rights would outweigh the state
interest unless it was sho™ that the latter was compelling,
substantial, inMediate and subordinating. Both the language
and tone of Goldberg's opi.ic.n suggest the clear and present
danger test-that unless an individual or group presents a
clear and present danger to the survival of the state their
First Amendment rights cannot be limited by legislative
inquiries
.
I think it is safe to say that Justice Brennan would
impose similar rigorous requirements on the investigatory
power. And his opinions indicate that it matters little
whether it is Congress or a state legislature which has
limited free expression. Because of his belief in the great
value of those rights he stands ready to employ judicial
power regardless of the authority threatening them.
Demonstrations
Justice Brennan' s opinions in this area concern
what Harry Kalven has called "public issue picketing" . ''''^
Picketing is of course conduct as well as expression.
Justice Brennan accepts the general proposition that
'picketing and parading are subject to regulation even
though intertwined with expression and association.'"'"'^"^
Within that general framework the problem becomes specifying
under what conditions limitations may be properly imposed.
As will be seen, Justice Brennan' s belief in the "transcen-
dant value" of First Amendment rights results in his
-ce
V,
recognizing few conditions under which a state"4 ^J'
perly curb demonstrations.
The major weapon Justice Brennan employed to strike
dcvn state regulations was the doctrine of overbreadth.
A statute is overbroad when its prohibitions can encompass
both protected and unprotected expression.
^^^^.^
Brennan pointed out in his concurring opinion in Brown
Louisiana, overbreadth may be a result of the language
used in the law. In that litigation, blacks had staged a
sit-in at a public library. They were convicted for vio-
lating a state law making it a crime to congregate in a pub-
lic building under circumstances likely to produce a "breach
of the peace." Justice Brennan felt that there was danger
that the broad sweep of "breach of peace" might include con-
stitutionally protected activities . '"^^
It is clear that Brennan also feels that one con-
fronted with an overbroad statute should be free "to take
his chances and express himself." This was his view in
^^.Iker V. Birmingham
. Reverend Wyatt Walker and several
other black clergymen had applied for a permit to conduct a
civil rights demonstration. The city of Birmingham denied
180the application and obtained an injunction against any
civil rights demonstrations by Walker and his colleagues.
They did not reapply for a permit but instead conducted the
demonstration whereupon they were arrested and convicted of
contempt. Justice Stewart writing for the majority and up-
holding the convictions recognized that there were substantial
m-
was
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constitutional questions relating to the vagueness and over-
breadth of the statute upon which the injunction was based.
But the state court which had issued the injunction had
jurisdiction so the injunction itself was valid. Since the
demonstration was enjoined to support a valid government
terest in regulation of the use of streets, Stewart con-
cluded that the proper way for the plaintiffs to proceed
to challenge the injunction in Alabama courts rather than to
violate it.
In a strongly worded dissent Justice Brennan indicated
his view that the majority was asking too much of the peti-
tioners. First of all, he felt that the permit statute was
unconstitutional because it conferred unfettered discretion
on local officials to grant or deny permits. Secondly,
to require Walker and his colleagues to challenge the in-
junction in court would result in delaying the protest.
And for Brennan, "The ability to exercise protected protest
at a time when such exercise would be effective must be as
protected as the beliefs themselves . "•'-^^
Justice Brennan also attacked the validity of the in-
junction itself. It had been issued ex parte
. Brennan con-
siders such a procedure an invalid prior restraint on ex-
pression, more dangerous to speech than statutes . "'"^^
In short. Justice Brennan would have permitted Walker
and his colleagues to speak first and challenge the permit
law later had they been prosecuted under it. Instead, the
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or
-jority had permitted the Imposition of an improper pri
restraint under an overbroad statute.
In Brennan's view overbreadth also justifies relaxa-
tion of rules which inhibit litigation of constitutional
claims in federal courts. He has made that view clear in
Dombrowski v. PfisterlS^ which, although not dealing with-
limitation of demonstrations, established principles which
were at issue in two cases''-^^ th»r idi^es at did involve protest ac-
tivities.
A civil rights organization filed suit in a federal
district court seeking an injunction against its prose-
cution for alleged violation of Louisiana sedition laws.
It charged that the laws were overbroad and therefore in-
valid on their face and that prosecution was threatened only
to dissuade it from civil rights activities. The district
court held to the doctrine of abstention. That doctrine
maintains that a federal court should avoid resolving un-
clear questions of state law when resolution of those ques-
tions by state courts might dispose of the constitutional
question.
Justice Brennan, writing for the maj ority , "'•^^ held
that the district court's reliance on abstention was mis-
placed. Prosecutions under an overbroad statute had a
"chilling effect" on freedom of expression. Given the
fragile nature of that right all those subject to such laws
could not be required to test their rights by risking prose-
cution. In addition, Brennan saw the record as indicating
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harrass^ent of the petitioners by state officials seeking to
discourage civil rights activities. That constituted suf-
ficient irreparable ininrv ^r^ ^ • iF ju y to set aside recourse to absten-
tion. Justice Brennan summarized his view as follows:
pria?i%nr^ abstention doctrine is inappro-
Y-.fy ' ^statutes are justifiably at-tacked on their face as abridging f^e ex-pression, or as applied for the purpose ofdiscouraging protected activities . 188
Yet Justice Brennan seems to have limited the reach
of this rule three years later in his Cameron^^^ ^^^^^^^^
That case involved black pickets marching in front of a
courthouse in Mississippi. For several months they had done
so with the permission of local officials. The state legis-
lature then passed an anti-picketing statute which forbade
all picketing that "unreasonably" interfered with ingress
or egress from public buildings. The day after passage of
the statute local officials read it to the pickets and
ordered them to leave. When the demonstrators appeared the
next day they were arrested. In district court the law was
challenged as void on its face due to vagueness and over-
breadth. The pickets also sought an injunction against fur-
ther enforcement, alleging that their arrest was part of a
bad faith plan of selective enforcement for the purpose of
harrassment, with no expectation of securing convictions.
The district court rejected their contentions.
As one source has indicated, '"^'^ Justice Brennan 's
opinion here was not inconsistent with his Dombrowski
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ruling. He had held there that abstention was inappropriate
xf the challenged law was either overbroad or there was evi-
dence of bad faith enforcement. But for Justice Brennan
neither element was present in Cameron. The law was neither
vague nor overbroad. ^^l
^^^^^^
case any evidence of bad faith enforcement. Brennan recog-
nized that proper enforcement of this valid law could have a
chilling effect on protected expression but for him that in
itself did not render the law unconstitutional. This was so,
Brennan said, because the statute sought to regulate picket-'
ing, a form of conduct intertwined with expression. When
such conduct constitutes an unreasonable obstruction to free
access to public buildings it may be properly limited even
thought it is related to protected expression.
It seems to me that what Justice Brennan did in
Cameron was to relax the Dombrowski rule in light of the
Court's decision in Cox v. Louisiana
. Two elements of
Cox are particularly relevant to Cameron. The majority in
Cox held that communication by conduct did not enjoy the
same protection as communication by "pure speech. ""'•^^
Throughout his Cameron opinion, Justice Brennan stressed the
conduct of the plaintiffs. Yet that element alone is not
enough to explain Brennan 's narrow reading of Dombrowski
.
Conduct was a part of all the demonstrations Brennan dealt
ith, and Cameron is the only instance in which he would per-
t limitation of the protest. But there is a second ele-
ment of the Cox ruling which I believe to be the major
w
mi
78
unart.culated precise of Justice Brennan's Csueron opinion
In cox the court upheld the constitutionality of a state law
prohibiting demonstrations In front of court houses. Justice
Goldberg stated that such laws were in support of the states
interest in protecting the judicial process and that demon-
strations "inherently thrpa^oT^" t-u-^^- 194^LiL.x_y LUi-eatien that process. The
demonstration at issue in Carneron was also conducted in front
of a courthouse. I believe that in the final analysis it was
this fact which caused Justice Brennan to pull back from the
Dombrowski ruling. While one can view the Mississippi Anti-
Picketing statute as neither vague nor overbroad in its ter-
minology, it takes very little perception to understand the
purpose of passage of such a law during a major voting
rights drive by civil rights organizations. Clearly, the
goal was to stifle expression of unpopular views. But
Justice Brennan put that consideration aside because he ac-
cepted, it seems to me, the assertion of a valid state inter-
est, protection of the judicial process, as automatically
validating the application of a law passed in support there-
of. This is precisely the approach he so effectively at-
tacked in Uphaus v. Wyman . ^'^^
Justice Brennan' s opinions in cases involving demon-
strations indicate a generally broad view of the right to
express protest through conduct. The one significant excep-
tion would seem to be a limitation he would permit on ob-
structive picketing of court houses. That exception aside.
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he would not permit limitation effected by overbroad
statutes nor would he allow punishment of demonstrators
whose words do not incite to violence but simply offend
those who hear them.
Denial of Benefits
The cases examined in this section deal with loyalty
programs designed to deny government benefits to alleged
subversives. Five of the seven opinions Justice Brennan
wrote in these cases deal with issues only remotely con-
nected to freedom of expression
. The two remaining
opinions, however, emphasize Brennan's insistence that
statutes employed to regulate speech must be precise.
The California constitution required that tax exemp-
tions be denied to any person who advocated violent over-
throw of the state or federal government or who advocated
support of a foreign government engaged in hostilities with
the United States. As a result, the state legislature
passed a law requiring property tax exemption claimants to
sign an oath on their tax return stating that they did not
engage in the proscribed advocacy. State courts ultimately
upheld the constitutional provision and the exemption statute
against challenges that each constituted a denial of freedom
of speech v/ithout due process of law. The issues reached
the Supreme Court in Speiser v. Randall . ^^'^
Justice Brennan's lead opinion focused on the procedure
established by the California law. For him, the unconstitu-
80
t.onaI Vice of ,Hat procedure was that it imposed the burden
of proof on the individual to demonstrate that his speech
was not the advocacy proscribed by the law. Brennan felt
that the result of that burden would be that
The man who knows he must bring forthproof and persuade another of the lawfulness of his conduct necessarily must steerfar wider of the unlawful zone than i| theState must bear these burdens. 198 '^'^^
Ultimately then. Justice Brennan felt that the failure of
the state to provide more "sensitive tools" with which to
distinguish between protected and unprotected expression
would have a chilling effect on speech shielded by the First
Amendment.
That same chilling effect might be produced by laws
whose substance did not clearly state what is proscribed.
In holding four provisions of the New York loyalty program
void for vagueness, j^^^^^^ Brennan indicated that the
intricacy and complexity of the program coupled with the am-
biguity of terms such as "seditious" stifled the academic
freedom of teachers required to sign a loyalty oath as a con-
dition of employment. For Brennan, academic freedom is a
particular concern of the First Amendment, of "transcendant
value" to all of society.
Justice Brennan 's Keyishian opinion also held that a
teacher could not be dismissed for mere membership in an
organization with illegal goals even if the faculty member
had knowledge of those goals. It must be shown that the
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teacher himself had specific intent to co^it illegal acts
in pursuit of the organization's ai.s. Coupled with Justice
Brennan-s ruling in the S^eiser case, this meant that the
state had the burden to prove in each case that the al-
legedly subversive individual intended to coimi^it illegal
acts before he could be dismissed.
Justice Brennan's repeated demand, reflected in the
two opinions discussed and in his voting in the cases not ex-
amined, is for precision in the laws seeking to deny benefits
on the basis of alleged disloyalty. The interplay between
Speiser and Keyishian is the culmination of this insistence.
When the two cases are taken together, Justice Brennan very
strongly implies that a loyalty-security program is only
permissible under two conditions. First, the proscribed ex-
pression must be precisely defined by the law. Secondly, an
employee cannot be dismissed for disloyalty unless the state
has employed procedures akin to those required of it prior
to the imposition of criminal sanctions. In short both sub-
stance and procedure must be precise in recognition of the
fragile nature of freedom of expression.
Miscellaneous Cases
One of the most important freedom of expression cases
to arise during Justice Brennan' s tenure on the Court was
the Pentagon Papers case.^^^ The Nixon administration
sought to enjoin the New York Times and the Washington Post
from further publication of the Pentagon Papers, a history
of American involvement in Indochina which was written under
government auspices. The Ee^^uriam opinion of the Court
held that the government had failed to meet the heavy burden
of justifying the imposition of a prior restraint on the
press. In addition to that opinion, there were nine others
handed down, six concurring and three dissent.
Justice Brennan's concurrence made it emphatically
clear what he considered the only condition under which a
prior restraint could be imposed on protected expression.
That condition existed in a very narrow class of cases and
only when the nation was at war. In order that a restraint
be justified, Brennan would require that there was ample,
clear evidence that publication would "inevitably lead to an
event kindred to endangering the safety of a troop ship."
But the government's case here was premised on the view that
publication of the Papers "might" endanger national security.
In Justice Brennan' s view
the First Amendment tolerates absolutely
no prior judicial restraints of the press
predicated upon surmise or conjecture that
untoward consequences may result.
Consequently, Brennan felt that every restraint permitted in
the case, for whatever reason, had violated the First Amend-
ment.
Justice Brennan' s view here is perfectly consistent
with his earlier discussions of prior restraint in the ob-
202scenity cases. He indicated there that a temporary brief
restraint could be imposed while a determination of whether
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a challenged work was in fart oKc..t c obscene, that is unprotected
expression, was being
.ade. But here, where the material
was clearly protected expression, he viewed the First Amend-
ment as permitting "pKco1,,+- t nF xuL absolutely" no prior restraint.
The three remaining cases^Oa ^^.^
^^^^^ ^^^^^^^
demonstrate what Justice Brennan views as the reach of the
concept of freedom of expression.
In the Button case Justice Brennan dealt with
Virginia's attempt to apply its law forbidding solicitation
of legal business to the N.A.A.C.P. He found the state law
vague and overbroad because it could be applied to the
N.A.A.C.P.
-s efforts to advocate legal action to assert the
rights of blacks. Constitutional protection. Brennan said,
extends not only to activities which can be classified with-
in a "narrow literal conception" of freedom of speech but
also to other forms of political expression including liti-
gation.
Concurring in Lamont v. Postmaster General
. Justice
Brennan expressed an even broader view of the rights pro-
tected by the First Amendment. In a tone similar to that of
Justice Douglas in the Griswold case,^°^ Justice Brennan
stated
the protection of the Bill of Rights goes be-
yond the specific guarantees to protect from
congressional abridgement those equally funda-
mental personal rights necessary to make the
express guarantees fully meaningful . 205
This view is of course consistent with Brennan 's overall ju-
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dxcial activism. In a sense he stands ready to "create"
rights in order to augment the stipulated guarantees of the
Bill of Rights.
The final case in this group is one of the clearest
statements Justice Brennan has made as to the overall system
of expression he feels is demanded by the First Amendment.
In C^B^ V. Democratic National Committ.. Justice Brennan
dissented from the majority view that broadcasters had the
right to refuse to sell air time to those wishing to speak
out on public issues.
balancing what I perceive to be the com-
pet3-ng interests of broadcasters thelistening and viewing public, and individu-
als seeking to express their views over the
electronic media, I can only conclude thatthe exclusionary policy upheld today can
serve only to inhibit, rather than further
our profound national commitment to theprinciple that debate on public issues^sbouldbe uninhibited, robust and wide open.'^^^
For Justice Brennan, then, the First Amendment demands a
marketplace of ideas. What he would require is a limited
207right of access. He does not specify how that right
would be limited. But he would have the Court read the
First Amendment as protecting both the right to hear debate
and the right to participate therein.
While Justice Brennan' s view here is theoretically
laudable there is one rather considerable practical problem.
In order for there to exist any right to access someone,
most probably the government, will have to tell broadcasters
what to put on the air. That would seem to me to be a more
serious First Amendment problem than that Justice Brennan
raises. As he himself said in his Slaton^^S opinion it is
not the government's business to tell people what they
should read or hear
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A CONCLUDING NOTE
At the time of this writing William Brennan has
served on the Supreme Court for 18 years, the second long-
est tenure of the Justices presently sitting. During that
period he has been a consistent proponent of a very
vigorous system of freedom of expression. His views, as ex-
pressed in the cases examined in this study, can be dis-
cussed in terms of several different elements.
The most critical element is Justice Brennan' s belief
that freedom of expression plays the primary role in de-
fining the nature of the American system. For him, that
freedom insures that the people have the means to govern
themselves. It provides both the right to check the govern-
ment through criticism and the flow of information the
people require if they are to criticize intelligently. But
Justice Brennan does not view the First Amendment as
shielding only that expression which deals with public
issues. Rather, he views freedom of expression extending to
all matters in which the prople are interested.
Given Brennan' s view of freedom of expression as
being of paramount value, one might then expect him to in-
sist on an absolute, literal reading of the First Amendment
admonition that "Congress shall make no law.
. regarding
speech. But he consistently rejects that approach in favor
of the more flexible case-by-case balancing of freedom of
expression against competing interests. At the same time he
brings to the balancing technique a strong bias in favor of
expression and against any limitation. For Justice Brennan
to permit an attempt to regulate expression, that limita-
tion must be xmposed in support of a clearly identifiable
interest which is more important than exnression given the
particular circumstances of the specific case. Further he
requires that there be compelling evidence that limiting ex-
pression is the only method whereby a competing interest can
be protected. Justice Brennan also insists that the means
chosen to impose restrictions on expression meet rigorous
standards. The language of the law must be precise and the
procedures it utilizes carefully designed and executed.
This reflects Justice Brennan' s demand that limitations on
expression be carried out with tools sensitive enough to
separate protected from unprotected expression.
While Brennan has been generally consistent in main-
taining the views discussed to this point there are two
notable inconsistencies. The first is of course his rejec-
tion of the balancing technique in his obscenity decisions.
In Roth and its progeny Brennan fails to weight competing
interests and instead simply labels one type of expression
"unprotected." As has been pointed out,^°^ it is my view
that this is a result of a universal inability to identify
what, if any, interest is being damaged by obscene expres-
sion. The second inconsistency occurs in Brennan' s Cameron
opinion. In that case he disregarded the circumstances of
the case and placed protection of the judicial process above
the particular for. of expression employed. One can only
hypothesize that Justice Brennan's view here is a result of
his personal sensitivity to the demands of the judicial pro-
cess. But that of course does not make it any the less in-
consistent with his general approach.
Justice Brennan's balancing of the "transcendent
value" of freedom of speech against other values is also
significant as an expression of his judicial activism.
Brennan believes that the protection of First Amendment
rights is the primary responsibility of the judiciary and
ultimately of the Supreme Court. Consequently, he is quite
willing to employ the power of the Court to vindicate free-
dom of expression where he sees it threatened. His activism
also leads him to supplement the literal commands of the
First Amendment with additional guarantees, like the right
to access, which he feels are required if that Amendment is
to be fully employed.
Justice Brennan's liberal activist views were of sig-
nificant influence in shaping First Amendment law during the
Warren court period. Thus was particularly true in obscenity
210and libel. In the former, Justice Brennan formulated
the Roth test which became the focal point around which the
obscenity debate was conducted both within the Court and in
society in general. Between 1957, the year of his appoint-
ment to the Court, and 1968 when the Court began to experi-
ence personnel changes. Justice Brennan wrote the majority
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or lead opinion in eleven of the sixteen signed obscenity
decisions handed down. If we make a gross count of the
votes in each case, considering only agreement and disagree-
ment with the conclusion of Brennan's opinion, only one
case of the eleven, Ginzbur^, was marked by a 504 division
of the Court. In short, Brennan was able to gain support
'
for his conclusions of at least six members of the Court in
ten of the eleven obscenity opinions he .^ote. But the
gross count does give a misleading impression as to his per-
suasiveness. By examining concurrences and dissents one
gets a somewhat different view of the interaction within
the Court. The most consistent writers of concurring
opinions were Justices Black and Douglas. They concurred
six times, either when Brennan held a particular work not
obscene or when he voided a censorship procedure. They
reached the same result he did but from their own view that
the First Amendment imposes an absolute prohibition against
expression except when it is an inseparable part of illegal
action. Their dissents came first when Brennan either held
that obscenity was outside the protection of the First
Amendment (Roth ) and later when he upheld the conviction of
sellers of obscene materials (Ginzburg
,
Mishkin
,
and
Ginsberg )
.
The most consistent dissenter was Mr. Justice
Harlan, who disagreed with Brennan 's finding in seven of
the eleven cases. Harlan's disagreement with Brennan is
essentially over the role of the Court with respect to state
90
actxvxty in obscenity censorship. Harlan would li.it the
court by allowing the states to enforce different obscenity
standard and censorship procedures as long as they were
-reasonable." He sees the states as having the primary
responsibility for the regulation of morality and feels the
Court should act as only a passive check on "irrationality."
Justice Brennan, however, has viewed the Court as having the
major responsibility for establishing an obscenity standard
and censorship procedure, since questions involving expres-
sion raise constitutional issues which he feels are primarily
the Supreme Court's concern. Consequently, he has not hesi-
tated to strike down state laws when they don't square with
the uniform requirements established by the Court.
Justice Brennan' s most consistent supporter was Chief
Justice Warren. The Chief Justice joined ten of the eleven
obscenity opinions written by Brennan. His sole dissent
came in the Jacobellis decision because, among other things,
he felt the lower courts had acted reasonably in finding the
cited film obscene. Warren's general support of Brennan was
given despite the Chief Justice's view that obscenity cases
should focus on the actions of the people involved rather
than on the contents of the book or film. Brennan did not
explicitly accept this concept of variable obscenity until
the Ginzburg and Mishkin cases in 1966.
Given his own distaste for obscenity censorship then,
Justice Brennan had a relatively consistent three man bloc
s>ame
supporting him-Warren, Black and Douglas. The same bloc
supported his five majority/lead opinions in libel.
What then can be said regarding Justice Brennan's
"leadership" of thp ^nT1T•^? t*-P r cue Court It seems to me that leadership
in this context is of two dimensions: the creation of a
stable bloc of Justices through the persuasiveness of one
of the bretheren's opinions; secondly, the shaping of basic
doctrines of constitutional law. One cannot credit Justice
Brennan with creating the liberal activist bloc on the
Warren Court. It was there when he assumed his seat. Fur-
ther, Black and Douglas most often concurred in Brennan'
decision rather than accepted his reasoning. At the s
time it must be recognized that neither Justice Black nor
Justice Douglas, given their absolutism, could have at-
tracted the fifth vote needed for a majority. Justice
Brennan then can be credited with going far enough towards
the Black/Douglas position to hold their concurrence while
maintaining the flexibility needed to attract the additional
vote(s) needed to maintain a majority.
It is in the second area of leadership, that of
shaping the law, that I feel Justice Brennan has had the
greatest influence. In both obscenity and libel, Justice
Brennan's views have established the framework within which
the respective legal issues were examined. The Roth test
in obscenity and the actual malice rule in libel are still
the starting points in dealing with those First Amendment
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problems even the Burger Court, embarking on a proclaimed
new direction in obscenity censorship, has anchored its
position in Roth . "^^^
By virtue of his ability to sustain a majority behind
his views Justice Brennan has played perhaps the major role
in shaping the Court's position on two important free expres-
sion issues. And his efforts in both areas have been direc-
ted towards facilitating the free interchange of ideas he
feels so essential to the operation of the American system.
The changes in the personnel of the Court which have
taken place over the past six years will serve to limit
Justice Brennan' s leadership. President Nixon's four ap-
pointments, all judicial conservatives, have formed a solid
bloc which is generally less favorably inclined toward First
Amendment claims than Brennan. Consequently, Justice Brennan
will frequently dissent as he did in the Slaton and Miller
cases
.
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Ill
^or an extensive discussion of the rieht to acrpc;^Jerome Barron, "Access to the Press-A New First Lendment Right," Harvard Law Review
. 80 (1967) p UaS'trand Jerome BarroHT-A^TEmerging First Amendment Riehr ofAccess to the 50 Articles Midi!?," George JonLaw Review
, 37 (1969), p. 487-509. ^
wastimgt
208^ . ,
, ,Pans Adult Theater v. Slaton 413 U.S. 49 73-114 (1^7-^^
bee above, p. 304.
210,
^ , .Justice Brennan s opinions in the internal security cases
were of considerably less significance. The comments
that follow should be taken to pertain primarily to ob-
scenity censorship and libel.
211See above, p. 20-27.
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